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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of transnational terrorism has revitalized the once strong and special 
relationship between the Philippines and the United States which has been stagnant since 
the two countries failed to conclude a new military bases agreement in the early 1990s. In 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Philippine 
government gave its strong support to the US-sponsored Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT). Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo mentioned that “the Philippines 
is prepared to go every step of the way, as needed.” Arroyo offered logistical help and the 
use of Philippine air space and ports to support military operations in Afghanistan. She 
cited morality and Philippine national interests as reasons for her pro-US stand. She 
defined the national interest as linking a struggle against international terrorism with the 
struggle against terrorism within the Philippines.1 In response, US President George W. 
Bush pledged to increase Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to the Philippines from $1.9 
million to $29 million. Bush also pledged an additional billion dollars in trade benefits 
and announced his desire to provide an additional $10 million in US Department of 
Defense goods and services to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Overall, it was 
noted that security assistance offered to the Philippine government was now expected to 
be worth nearly $100 million for 2001 and 2002.2 
In January 2002, US military forces were deployed to the southern Philippines to 
participate in the joint military exercise Balikatan3 02-1. Balikatan 02-1 is a Philippine – 
American counterterrorism cooperation wherein US military forces provided training, 
equipment, and intelligence information assistance to the AFP in their combat operations 
against the Abu Sayyaf Group.  US military personnel have also acted as advisers to AFP 
field commanders at the battalion level.  It was the first time that the Balikatan exercise 
                                                 
1 Mark Landler, “Philippines Offers US Its Troops and Bases,” New York Times, 2 October 2001, 5. 
2 “US Pledges Massive Military, Economic Aid to the Philippines,” Asia Times Online, 23 November 
2001, available from http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/CK23Ae01.html, accessed on 15 October 15, 2005. 
3 “Balikatan” is a Filipino word used as code name for the series of joint military exercises conducted 
between the US and the Philippines under the auspices of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. It means 
“shoulder-to-shoulder.” 
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was conducted in Mindanao but it was not the first time that US military forces were 
deployed in the southern Philippines.  
During the American colonial rule of the Philippines, the US Army governed 
southern Mindanao on the assumption that its population was wild, backward and 
unpacified.4  A series of battles were fought between US and the Moros5 from 1902 to 
around 1910.  Two of the dramatic last stands of the Moros were remembered as the 
massacres at Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak, where hundreds of Muslims, including women 
and children, perished in heavy bombardment by US artillery which was followed by 
ground troops storming in with sophisticated weapons.6  
These incidents are just two of the unpleasant memories haunting 
counterterrorism cooperation between the Philippines and the US in Mindanao.  
Balikatan 02-1 was also complicated by the existence of two major threat groups in 
Mindanao – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the communist New People’s 
Army (NPA). Many critics argue that Balikatan 02-1 violated the Philippine Constitution, 
while others feared that the US military presence in Mindanao may affect ongoing peace 
negotiations with the MILF.  On the other hand, most Filipinos are satisfied with the US 
assistance to the AFP in fighting the Abu Sayyaf and would like the US soldiers to go to 
other combat zone aside from Basilan.7  They view the renewed security alliance between 
the Philippines and its former colonial master as an opportunity to find solutions in 
ending the violence in the southern Philippines. 
A. PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the military cooperation 
between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the US known as the Balikatan 
                                                 
4 Patricio Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative 
Historical Overview,” Politics and Security Series No. 7, East-West Center Working Papers (October 
2004), available from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PSwp007.pdf#search='balikatan%20021, 
accessed on 5 August 2005. 
5 “Moro” is a termed bestowed by the Spaniards on the ethnic Malay people native to the southern 
Philippines. It also refers to Filipino Muslims.     
6 Reynaldo C. Ileto, “Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory,” Positions 13:1, Duke University 
Press, 2005, 232. 
7 Social Weather Stations Media release dated August 6, 2002, available from available from 
http://www.sws.org.ph/, accessed on 24 November 2005. 
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exercises can be developed by the Philippine government as a peace-building tool that 
also integrates anti-terrorism measures for the southern Philippines.  To accomplish this,  
the thesis first examines the legal framework of the Balikatan exercises. Second, the 
thesis studies the conduct of Balikatan 02-1 in 2002 and examines its successes, failures, 
and lessons learned from the exercise. Third, the thesis discusses what modifications may 
be adopted to improve the exercises' contributions to peace-building in Mindanao.  
The Balikatan exercise series is an annual event aimed originally at improving 
RP-US combined planning, combat readiness, and interoperability while enhancing 
security relations and demonstrating US resolve to support the Philippine government 
against external aggression.8 Balikatan is the largest joint-combined military exercise that 
the Philippines is participating with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As compared 
with previous Balikatan exercises, Balikatan 02-1 was the first time that the exercise was 
held in the southern Philippines, for a period of six months. Before then, the exercises 
were held in the island of Luzon and had a duration of one month. Furthermore, previous 
Balikatan exercises were focused on training against external aggressions while Balikatan 
02-1 were on training and advising Philippine military operations against an internal 
threat from the Abu Sayyaf Group. The main assumption of the research is that by 
continually conducting Balikatan exercises in Mindanao, the joint military exercise will 
be beneficial in terms of professionalizing and enhancing the capability of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines Southern Command and in promoting a sense of security for the 
people of Mindanao. During the initial planning survey for Balikatan 02-1, an assessment 
of the AFP’s ability to conduct effective combat operations against terrorist groups was 
conducted. The results of the assessment indicated that the AFP has a marginal 
communications structure, ineffective civil affairs, limited mobility, and a lack of 
intelligence fusion needed to support operations.9 During the course of Balikatan 02-1, 
US military advisers supported the AFP Southern Command in developing intelligence-
driven operations that promoted coordinated staff work and the fusion of intelligence 
                                                 
8 “Balikatan: Shouldering the Load Together,” Global Security Website, available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm, accessed on 10 October 2005. 
9 C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercises Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines,” Special 
Warfare (September 2004), 17, Pro Quest Database, accessed on 10 October 2005.  
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from all sources in the AFP joint operations center.10 AFP Southern Command is the 
largest and most important of the AFP’s unified commands. It is responsible for 
combating three major threat groups in the Philippines, namely the communist New 
People’s Army (NPA), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG). 
The people of Mindanao also deserve the most attention in security, political, and 
socio-economic terms. Based on the published human development index of 77 provinces 
in the Philippines by the National Statistical Coordination Board, the least developed 
provinces are all in Muslim Mindanao.11 Inadequacy of basic government services and 
poverty in Muslim Mindanao provinces are major sources of grievances against the 
Philippine government that drive discontented Filipino Muslims to secession and 
extremism. The civic-action projects conducted during Balikatan 02-1 were instrumental 
in promoting socio-economic development in areas afflicted by the violence in that 
region. Balikatan 02-1 has denied the ASG of its sanctuary and also curtailed their 
movement. Likewise, the humanitarian and civic-action projects during Balikatan 02-1 
earned local respect and reduced Muslim village support for the terrorists on Basilan. The 
humanitarian and civic-action projects also enabled the AFP, Philippine officials, and 
NGOs to work together and interact with the Basilan populace in a positive manner.12  
Furthermore, shifting the focus of Balikatan exercises from traditional warfighting 
to stabilization and reconstruction operations will be timely and appropriate for the AFP 
in preparation for the eventual conclusion of the peace negotiations with the MILF. In the 
past, the Philippine government has depended heavily on the predominance of military 
solutions to address insurgencies wherein it has failed to develop an effective strategy 
that entails the AFP to perform support roles in nation-building whenever hostilities 
ended.  For this reason, a successful concerted effort was never achieved by the 
Philippine military and other government agencies, as well as with NGOs in exploiting 
                                                 
10 C.H. Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams: The Unspoken SOCPAC Mission,” Special Warfare 
(September 2004), 47, Pro Quest Database, accessed on 10 October 2005.  
11 “2000 Philippine Human Development Index,” National Statistical Coordination Board, available 
from http://www.nscb.gov.ph/hdi/hdi2000.asp, accessed on 11 October 2005.  
12 C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF Operations during Balikatan 02-1,” 
Special Warfare (September 2004), 47, Pro Quest Database, accessed on 10 October 2005. 
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those windows of opportunity to build a sustainable peace in Mindanao, thus creating an 
environment prone to the resurgence of violence.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The Philippines remains to be afflicted by two of the oldest insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia. The communist NPA which was formed in 1969 has been seeking to 
overthrow the Philippine government through protracted guerilla warfare. In Southern 
Philippines, a Muslim secessionist movement led by the MILF has been fighting for a 
separate Muslim state since 1977. MILF is a breakaway faction of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) that fought for Mindanao independence from 1972 up to the 
time they signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. In addition, 
the Abu Sayyaf Group, formed in 1991 and the current target of the RP-US 
counterterrorism cooperation, is still posing a threat in the region. These perpetual 
insurgency problems and terrorist threats negatively affected the economic, social, and 
political stability of the Philippines. The US government has offered assistance to the 
Philippines in combating terrorism and in 2002, US sent military advisers to Mindanao to  
provide assistance to the AFP in fighting the ASG. Likewise, civic-action projects civic 
action projects under “Operation Gentle Wind” were also carried out which has 
significantly contributed in improving the living conditions in Basilan and Zamboanga. 
Thus, by looking over the lessons, problems, and prospects of Balikatan 02-1, the 
Philippine government can determine on how future Balikatan exercises may be develop 
into a tool for peace-building in southern Philippines. The conduct of the exercise in 
Mindanao created a sense of security that paved the way for social and economic 
development. The US Agency for International Development is also currently involve in 
development projects in Mindanao and with a close coordination of these two activities, 
more opportunities and advancement may be achieved in building a sustainable peace in 
Mindanao. Likewise, the Balikatan exercises is also a good opportunity for the AFP to 
professionalize and learn the concepts of stabilization and reconstruction operations 
which the US military had extensive experience in Japan, Germany, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In the past, the AFP’s strategy in fighting insurgencies was to “clear, hold, and 
consolidate” areas influenced by rebel groups. It seems that the AFP was successful only 
on the “clear” strategy but mostly failed in “holding” and “consolidating” these cleared 
6 
territories. Similar to the concepts of stabilization and reconstruction operations, after 
military forces had established a secure environment, it should transition from combat to 
support roles in nation-building. However, this is one area where the AFP, the national 
police, local and national government agencies, as well as NGOs lack coordination and 
training. There are many factors that contribute to this problem and one of this is the 
absence of AFP’s capability in stabilization and reconstruction operations.  The Balikatan 
exercise series is a good platform to start developing these capabilities through joint 
planning and training that will involve important actors who will play or are already 
playing a role in promoting stability and peace in Mindanao. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that AFP focus its efforts in developing 
peacekeeping and other peace-support capabilities rather than trying to advance its 
combat capability. Looking at reality, AFP is more suitable in performing peace 
operations in order to fulfill effectively its obligations under the RP-US Mutual Defense 
Treaty. The deployment of AFP personnel in Iraq is one example on how Philippines can 
support the US in its security initiatives by performing “military operations other than 
war” (MOOTW) like humanitarian assistance and peace-support operations. The 
development of this capability within the AFP and other Philippine government agencies 
is more beneficial in addressing the current threats in southern Philippines rather than 
focusing on traditional military solutions of war-fighting. 
Continuing the conduct of Balikatan exercises in Mindanao and focusing 
Balikatan activities on stabilization and reconstruction operations will be influential in 
promoting a sustainable peace in Southern Philippines. This thesis assesses the current 
security cooperation of the Philippines and United States and recommends how the 
Balikatan joint military exercise series can exert a positive influence to enhance peace 
and stability in the southern Philippines. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been significant debates among policy makers, scholars, and the civil 
society in the Philippines regarding the conduct of RP-US Balikatan 02-1 joint military 
exercise in Mindanao. Balikatan 02-1 was a six-month military counterterrorism 
cooperation with US troops providing advice and training to the AFP in combating the 
notorious Abu Sayyaf Group in the island of Basilan. However, critics charged that the 
7 
real reason was to go after the Abu Sayyaf who was holding two American hostages at 
that time. They also censured that it was a violation of the constitutional provision of 
banning foreign troops on Philippine soil. On the other hand, supporters of this bilateral 
cooperation responded that the American presence could improve the fighting capability 
of the AFP and that the American civic-action programs could jump start social and 
economic development that were postponed or derailed by the war and the Abu Sayyaf 
kidnappings13. As mentioned by Charles Donnelly in a paper presented at the 15th 
Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, the most important 
outcome of the Balikatan 02-1 exercises has been the enduring diplomatic and military 
courtship between Manila and Washington. The Bush administration has granted the 
Arroyo administration $100 million in security assistance; $20 million to modernize the 
Philippine armed forces; $10 million in Defense Department goods and services; $1 
billion in trade benefits; up to $430 million in debt relief; guarantees for up to $150 
million in agricultural exports; $40 million in food aid; and $29 million in poverty 
alleviation.14 Donnelly also argues that “the ASG remains outside the Philippine 
government’s locus of negotiations and are dealt with militarily. Despite facing 
overwhelming military odds, the group displays an uncanny knack to evade capture, 
regroup and restrike. It is therefore improbable that a military solution will produce a 
long-term solution to an entrenched problem.”15 Although this thesis agrees with 
Donnelly’s conclusions, it also argues that a stable and secure environment is necessary 
so that post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations can come in and lay the 
foundations for a long-term solution of the ongoing conflict.  Important post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction activities were not given enough emphasis during 
Balikatan 02-1. Additionally, according to Zachary Abuza, the Philippine Armed Forces 
failed to maintain the momentum generated by the joint Balikatan exercise in the second 
                                                 
13 Patricio Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative 
Historical Overview,” Politics and Security Series No. 7, (East-West Center Working Papers, October 
2004, available from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PSwp007.pdf#search='balikatan%20021, 
accessed on 5 August 2005. 
14 Charles Donnelly, “Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualizing the Abu Sayyaf Group 
as an Islamic Secessionist Organization,” (Australia: University of Tasmania, 2004), available from 




half of 2002.16 As he mentions, a spate of bombings and a regrouping of rebel forces 
frustrated the United States that led to the announcement by American and Filipino 
officials of a larger exercise directed at the Abu Sayyaf presence in Jolo, and this was 
interpreted in the Philippines as a declaration that US troops would be deployed in a 
combat role. The subsequent outcry forced the cancellation of the exercise.17 
In another paper focusing on the impact of Balikatan 02-1 to Philippine 
democracy and peace, Neri Javier Colmenares argues that “the continuing US military 
operations in the Philippines, within the context of the US war against terror, have 
substantially eroded the already weak democratic processes in the Philippines and also 
pose a serious threat to peace and stability in Asia-Pacific.”18 He further says that the 
current military operations and the growing reliance of President Gloria Arroyo’s 
administration on the Philippine military provides a fertile ground for the full return of 
anti-democratic and militarist forces akin to those that supported martial law under 
President Ferdinand Marcos. Colmenares also commented that the peace process 
particularly with the MILF and the National Democratic Front (NDF) representing the 
communist NPA, have been substantially derailed by the deployment of US troops, as 
well as threats of the US to expand their operations against these groups.19 
Despite numerous criticisms of Balikatan 02-1, the joint military cooperation also 
had many positive accomplishments. Aside from eradicating major ASG strongholds and 
key leadership, it was also able to ameliorate the conditions of poverty and hopelessness 
that allow terrorist groups to flourish. As stated by Marco Garrido in his article “The 
evolution of Philippine Muslim insurgency”, the first round of Balikatan 02-1 was 
somewhat a success. The joint operations largely decimated the ASG and forced the 
group out of Basilan. The civic and humanitarian projects that accompanied the exercise 
                                                 
16 Zachary Abuza, “Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror,” (Colorado: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2003). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Neri Javier Colmenares, “US Military Operations in the Philippines: A Threat to Peace and 
Democracy,” Conference “War on Terror”: A Challenge to Democracy, 2002, 5-6, available from 
http://www.migrante.org.au/downloads/USPhils.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2005. 
19 Neri Javier Colmenares, 6. 
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re-established a sense of peace and order on the island.20 By replicating the success of 
Balikatan 02-1 and correcting its flaws, it can serve as a linchpin in attaining a stable and 
secure environment in southern Philippines. In the absence of a secure environment, it 
will be very difficult to introduce vital socio-economic programs and non-military 
measures which are important in countering terrorism in the southern Philippines. 
According to Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, social and economic development can 
discourage terrorist recruits.21 They argue that many terrorist organizations attract new 
members from communities in which terrorism is considered a viable response to 
perceived grievances. Social and economic development policies can help to reduce the 
pools of potential recruits by reducing their perceived grievances and providing the 
members of these communities with viable alternatives to terrorism.  
In a statement made by Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for the Office of 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he 
maintains that “there has been no greater supporter of the concept of developing a strong 
civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability than the uniformed military.”22 He 
cited that “in every single combatant command, soldiers have been increasingly pushed 
to take up responsibilities that they were not trained to do. The military wants to work 
with civilians that can be deployed with them to undertake civilian activities, allowing the 
military to concentrate on those activities for which they should be responsible. There is a 
need for partnership in planning that begins at the outset and is interlinked all the way 
through training, exercises, and finally the process of stabilization and reconstruction.”23 
Joint training and military exercises are confidence and security building measures that 
enhance cooperation and understanding among the military, as well as non-military, and 
the Philippine public. Exercises limit or reduce the level of distrust among participants 
which is essential for building confidence and a sense of security. It also could contribute 
                                                 
20 Marco Garrido, “The Evolution of the Philippine Muslim Insurgency,” Asia Times (2003), 
available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EC06Ae03.html, accessed on 25 August 
2005. 
21 Peter Chalk and Kim Cragin, “Terrorism and Development,” RAND Corporation, 2003, available 
from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1630/MR1630.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2005. 
22 Carlos Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Building Peace in a Hostile Environment”. 
Prepared Statement presented to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, (2005), available from 
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/48643.htm, accessed on 27 September 2005. 
23 Ibid. 
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to trust-building among the AFP, civilian government agencies, and the broader 
population. By involving other stakeholders in the conduct of joint military exercises in 
Mindanao, a more cohesive effort in conflict resolution can be achieved. According to 
Alfredo Filler, “ordinary police action and even military insurgency weapons and tactics, 
are not effective in eliminating the ASG’s threat. A special anti-terrorist campaign plan, 
specially trained and equipped police and military units, working with the local 
executives and a network of special support systems, is needed.”24 The network of 
special support system will help build social capital in Mindanao by enabling and 
empowering government agencies, the civil society, the private sector, and the 
international community to work together in formulating and implementing a coherent 
strategy for peace and prosperity in Mindanao. 
In summary, the Philippine-American counterterrorism cooperation in Mindanao 
has been beset by contradicting issues and concerns on the political, legal, military, and 
socio-economic context. Three years have already passed since Balikatan 02-1 and US 
troops were not directly involved in combat actions. They have remained as advisers and 
trainers to Philippine military forces. Balikatan has not been expanded to fight the 
communist New People’s Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as some critics 
feared would. At the moment, there are still US Special Forces in the Philippines who are 
advising and assisting the Philippine military in enhancing its capability in fighting 
terrorism but their numbers are relatively small as compared to Balikatan 02-1. As a 
component of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, Balikatan 02-1 was very important in 
enhancing the security cooperation between the United States and the Philippines, as well 
as in improving the Philippine military’s professionalism. Furthermore, it has proven its 
worth when it created a sense of security and peace in the island of Basilan. However, I 
argue that the ASG threat still exist in other parts of Mindanao and the success of 
Balikatan 02-1 may only be  temporary if no aggressive follow-through on the part of the 
Philippine government in addressing other factors that contribute to the violence in 
Mindanao. By developing on the success of Balikatan 02-1 and shifting the focus from 
counter-terrorism to stability operations, there will be a greater opportunity of improving 
                                                 
24 Alfredo Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence Vol. No. 14, No.4 (Winter 2002), 142.  
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the socio-economic conditions of deprived Filipino Muslims thus giving peace a chance 
to flourish in the region. 
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
1. Major Questions 
This thesis explores the Philippine – American security cooperation and focuses 
on how this alliance can contribute to building a sustainable peace in Mindanao. More 
specifically, the thesis asks how the RP-US Balikatan exercise series may be conducted 
to contribute to a sustainable peace in the southern Philippines. For the purpose of this 
paper, sustainable peace is defined as the situation when, no matter what conflict occurs, 
parties no longer consider war to be an option.  
The United States, as the only country with which the Philippines has a Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT), is considered to be the Philippines' most important ally. The 
Philippine-American security alliance had its beginnings after World War II, when both 
countries signed the 1951 MDT. The treaty aims to provide mutual military assistance in 
case of an armed attack against one of the signatories. To ensure interoperability and a 
well-coordinated operation when the need arises, the AFP and the US Armed Forces from 
time to time conduct military exercises within Philippine territory. In 1947, the Military 
Bases Agreement (MBA) was also instituted, allowing the US to set up military bases on 
Philippine soil. Similarly, the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) was signed that 
year; it served as the basis for the creation of the Joint United States Military Advisory 
Group - Philippines (JUSMAG-P). The 1947 MAA provided military aid used to support 
and reorganize the Philippine Constabulary in late 1947 in the face of growing internal 
unrest during the Hukbalahap rebellion.25 In 1991, the MBA was terminated and in 1992, 
the US military forces based in the Philippines were all withdrawn. Despite the closing of 
the US military bases, both countries maintained their security alliance under the MDT.  
The 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits the presence of foreign troops in 
Philippine territory.  For this reason, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was forged in 
order to continue the conduct of joint military exercises. Negotiations for the ratification 
of the VFA encountered numerous obstacles and were continuously criticized by many                                                  
25 “Hukbalahap” is an acronym for “Hukbo Laban sa Hapon,” meaning “People Anti-Japanese 
Army.” The Hukbalahap movement, known simply as the “Huk,” was a communist-led guerilla movement 
that developed after World War II and launched an armed revolt against the Philippine government. 
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Filipino nationalists, as well as by anti-US movements. It was eventually ratified in 1999 
and the Balikatan exercises resumed in 2000.  
The rise of transnational terrorism created a new threat environment different 
from the Cold War and this led to the conduct of Balikatan 02-1. As with the VFA, 
Balikatan 02-1 was plagued by questions about its legality. Many Filipino 
constitutionalists argued that the role of US military forces are bordering on actual 
combat operations that is prohibited under the Philippine constitution. However, its 
successes in eliminating ASG strongholds and key leaders gained it support from many 
Filipinos. Without a doubt, the presence of US military, with its improved technology and 
effective monitoring techniques, added pressure on the ASG in Mindanao. US forces in 
Mindanao have brought an added sense of security to the local people and because of 
this, there are clamors from other parts of the country that similar activities be conducted 
in their localities so that they can also benefit from what Basilan has gained from bilateral 
cooperation. There are three provinces that offered to host the next Balikatan exercise. 
The governors of North Cotabato, Occidental Mindoro, and Compostela Valley appealed 
to President Arroyo that their provinces be considered for future joint military exercises. 
They said that the development projects undertaken in Basilan during Balikatan 02-1 
could be replicated in their provinces. In addition, they also believed that the joint 
military exercise would “lessen the threats and dangers posed by such unwanted groups 
to the province and to the country,” referring to the communist New People’s Army.26  
In answering the main question of how future Balikatan exercises should be 
conducted, several subsidiary questions must also be answered. Answering the following 
questions allows formulation of a strategic plan for the conduct of future Balikatan 
exercises: 
• What is the legal framework for the conduct of RP-US joint military 
exercises? Can the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and other bilateral 
agreements between the Philippines and the United States be employed to 
promote peace and stability in Mindanao?  
• How did Balikatan 02-1 come about and what was the situation in 
Mindanao prior to its performance? How was the exercise planned and 
executed, and how did it progress?   
                                                 
26 “News Summaries on US-RP Military Agreements and Exercises,” March-April 2003, available 
from http://www.philsol.nl/news/03/USMilitary02-mar03.htm, accessed on 22 November 2005. 
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• What are the lessons to be learned, problems to be addressed, and 
potentials to be maximized from Balikatan 02-1?  
• What modifications can be implemented to improve the exercise's 
contribution to building a sustainable peace in Mindanao? 
2. Argument 
This thesis argues that the RP-US Balikatan exercise series can be a tool for 
building a sustainable peace in Mindanao by means of concentrating its activities in the 
southern Philippines, as well as focusing on stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
The success of Balikatan 02-1 can be capitalized upon in order to promote stability in the 
region. However, it is also argued that the Balikatan exercises can only be successful if 
the planning and execution are transparent, the US military remains as advisers and 
trainers, and their military forces have a clear exit strategy so that the real intentions of 
the exercise will not create doubts or reservations in the minds of Philippine civil society.  
In this thesis, the RP-US security cooperation and Balikatan exercises, including 
its military, political, and aid components, comprises the independent variable (IV) which 
affects the achievement of a sustainable peace in Mindanao (DV). The introduction of the 
IV affects the intervening variables by strengthening the degree of professionalism within 
the AFP, as well as improving its military capabilities in combating terrorism and other 
security threats. Likewise, the aid component of security cooperation, and particularly the 
humanitarian and civic action programs, provides improvement in local living conditions 
in high conflict areas and discourages the presence of terrorist groups and further 
recruitment. 
With the increase in the degree of professionalism in the AFP, greater inclusion of 
stakeholders during the planning and training activities, more effective humanitarian and 
civic action programs, and a high level of support from Philippine civil society, terrorism 






The independent and dependent variables are diagrammed below:  
 
Figure 1.   Independent and Dependent Variable Diagram. 
The five intervening variables influence the capacity of the Balikatan exercises to 
build peace in Mindanao. The first intervening variable is the degree of military 
professionalism and integrity of the AFP, which embraces the moral conduct of its 
leadership and personnel in meeting national policies on the use of force for good. 
Human rights abuses, corruption, and the excessive use of force by the AFP in the past 
have undermined whatever successes Balikatan has achieved, and continued lack of 
professionalism will be detrimental in building a sustainable peace in Mindanao.  
The second intervening variable is the level of transparency in the planning and 
execution of the exercise. A high degree of transparency in the conduct of any bilateral 
activity will reassure Philippine civil society of the real intentions of the exercise and 
guarantee them that it is not a direct US military intervention or an infringement of 
Philippines’ sovereignty.  
The third intervening variable is the inclusion of other actors, particularly key 
local leaders, NGOs, and other government agencies that may be involved in future 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. These key actors, as much as possible, can be 
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invited to participate in the planning process as well as in training activities where they 
have a role to play, and especially in civil-military operations. A more inclusive activity 
involving key players will create considerable opportunities to build social capital among 
the key actors, thus enhancing cooperation among them and with the military.  
The fourth intervening variable is the degree of the impact on poorly developed 
provinces in Muslim Mindanao that is generated during the conduct of humanitarian and 
civic programs during Balikatan exercises The Balikatan humanitarian and civic 
programs can generate significant positive effects for the local populace, especially in 
far-flung areas that have been deprived of basic government services. A properly 
executed civic action program can reduce friction between the civilian population and the 
military force, thus generating more support from the local population on the peace 
initiatives for Mindanao.  
The last intervening variable is the degree of support from the Philippine civil 
society. Peace operations can only be successful and sustainable if they receive sufficient 
support from Philippine civil society. If there is a wide support for RP-US security 
cooperation and the proposed conduct of the Balikatan exercises, more opportunities can 
be generated that will contribute to promoting peace in Mindanao. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis analyzes the conduct of the Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercise in 
Mindanao using a case study method and determines the lessons learned, its failures, and 
its prospects for building peace in the southern Philippines. In view of the debates 
surrounding the joint military cooperation, information and evidence is included from 
previous studies, contemporary scholarly literature,  government and non-governmental 
organizations’ documents, news reports, and other library information services on how 
the Balikatan exercises and other joint military cooperation exercises were planned and 
executed and with what results.  Elucidation of the details of the Balikatan 02-1 case 
study is based on press releases and official statements from the governments of the 
United States and the Republic of the Philippines. After determining the legal 
frameworks, the lessons learned, and prospects for the RP-US Balikatan exercise, 
strategy options are formulated that can be adopted in future Balikatan exercises aimed at 
building peace in Mindanao. In developing a proposed strategy, this thesis used the 
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concepts developed by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the 
National Defense University in their publication Transforming for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Operations27 and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework 
developed jointly by the Center for International Strategic Studies (CSIS) and 
Association of United States Army (AUSA).  This thesis attempts to integrate these 
concepts with the current Philippine National Internal Security Plan, and the “clear, hold, 
consolidate, and develop” strategy in order to enhance the capability of the Philippine 
government in addressing the roots and causes of insurgencies and terrorism. 
F. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To provide the readers an adequate understanding of RP-US security cooperation 
and the Balikatan joint military exercise series, this paper is organized into five chapters.  
Chapter II is an overview on the legal framework of the Filipino-American 
security and defense cooperation that started after World War II, became strained during 
the closure of US military bases in the Philippines, and has been revitalized in the global 
war on terrorism. The chapter is a comprehensive review of the available literature, 
including published works and research by scholars and other written articles on RP-US 
security relations and the war against terrorism.  
Chapter III is an analysis of the RP-US Balikatan 02-1 exercise conducted on the 
island of Basilan, then a stronghold of Abu Sayyaf Group, in 2002. This chapter 
examines Balikatan 02-1's legal framework and discusses the relevant issues, 
controversies, and debates about how it was conducted. In this chapter, three phases of 
the exercise are examined, namely: the preparation phase, the training and field exercise 
phase, and the redeployment phase. The chapter also assesses the success of the joint 
military exercise based on its objectives and goals and how it affected the political and 
socio-economic conditions of Mindanao. 
Chapter IV analyzes the prospects of Balikatan exercises as a tool for peace-
building in Mindanao. It also discusses an overview of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations and how these relate to the Philippines’ National Internal Security Plan and 
the “clear, hold, consolidate, and develop” strategy. Likewise, strategy options will be 
                                                 
27 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming For Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004). 
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formulated and assessed to determine if the joint military exercises can be effectively and 
efficiently conducted in the format of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The 
concept of stabilization and reconstruction operations is very new to the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines.  In the past, the AFP has concentrated much of its efforts on 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. With the introduction of stabilization 
and reconstruction operations, there will be a wider opportunity for the military, other 
government agencies, and non-governmental organizations to work together to attain a 
sustainable peace within the country.  
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF RP-US SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The security cooperation maintained by the Philippines with the United States 
plays an important role in the security of not only the Philippines but also the entire Asia-
Pacific region. This relation began as early as 1898 when Filipino and American troops 
fought together against Spain, which had colonized the Philippines for more than three 
centuries. After the Spanish-American War, the US established colonial control of the 
Philippines based on the assessment that the Philippines is an important strategic forward 
base in the Asia-Pacific region. Military relations were first established during the 
colonial era when the United States helped the Philippines develop its military through 
the Philippine Commonwealth Act No. 1, also known as the National Defense Act of the 
Philippines of 1935.28 With the advent of war with Japan, the Philippines became a prime 
target for Japanese bombardments because of the US military bases and its active 
involvement in the Philippine defense system.  
After World War II, the Philippines and the United States maintained their 
relationship as allies. In 1947, the Philippine government signed two important 
agreements with the US that legally defined the parameters of Philippine-American 
security relations: the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement and the Philippine-
American Military Assistance Agreement. To further a collective defense of both 
countries, the Philippines and the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on 
August 30, 1951. The treaty recognized that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on 
either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and declares that it would act to 
meet the common dangers in accordance with its own peace and safety and declares that 
it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.”29  However, from 1946 until 1992, the US presence in the Philippines 
                                                 
28 “Philippine Army and Guerilla Records,” The US National Archives. National Personnel Records 
Center, St. Louis, available from http://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/philippine-army-
records.html, accessed on 8 October 2005. 
29 “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
America,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, available from 
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/frame/frmmdt.htm, accessed on 27 September 2005. 
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encountered opposition from different sectors of the Philippine society, particularly on 
the issue of sovereignty. 
After the 1986 Philippine revolution against the dictatorial rule of President 
Ferdinand Marcos and the re-emergence of a heightened Filipino nationalism, a new 
constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. The 1987 constitution states that a treaty 
approved by the Philippine Senate is necessary for foreign bases to remain in the country 
after 1991. The extension of the US military bases became a pivotal issue in Philippine 
politics. After negotiations in 1990, the Philippines notified the US that without a new 
treaty, American access to bases would be terminated in 1991. The US government 
proposed the Philippine-American Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security in 
1991 that could have extended the stay of US military forces in the Philippines. However, 
this proposal was rejected by the Philippine Senate, which led to the US withdrawal and 
the decline of the once strong and special Philippine-American relationship.  
The only legal framework guiding the Philippine-American security cooperation 
after the US military pullout was the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. In order to satisfy the 
provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on the presence of foreign troops on 
Philippine soil, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement, which provides a 
legal framework for the two countries to resume joint military exercises. It also lays 
down the rules governing the conduct of US troops while on Philippine territory. Since 
the ratification of the VFA, the Philippines and the United States have been conducting 
joint military exercises under the series designated as Balikatan. After the September 11 
attacks on the United States and the rise of transnational terrorism, the two countries 
reinvigorated their security cooperation through the conduct of Balikatan 02-1 in 2002 as 
a counterterrorism training effort aimed at neutralizing the Abu Sayyaf Group, which is 
believed to have links with al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.  
This chapter explains the dynamics of the Philippine-American security relations 
through the various stages from its beginnings until the resumption of the Balikatan 
exercises. Specifically, it reviews and discusses the legal basis for the Philippine-
American security cooperation, particularly on the conduct of joint military exercises and 
other military-to-military cooperation. It also analyzes and evaluates various issues and 
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debates about the significance of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting 
Forces Agreement on the US Global War on Terrorism and the ongoing conflict in 
Mindanao.  
B. PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY 
The sole foundation of RP-US security relations and the principal basis of the 
Balikatan series of military exercises is the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The MDT aims 
to provide mutual military assistance in case of an armed attack against either of the 
parties. To ensure interoperability and a well-coordinated operation when the need arises, 
the AFP and the US Armed Forces from time to time conduct military exercises within 
Philippine territory. Under Article 2 of the MDT, both parties would “separately and 
jointly by self-help and mutual aid . . . maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack.”30 As part of their mutual responsibilities under 
the terms of the MDT, these exercises help to upgrade the capacity of the AFP in case it 
is called upon to fulfill its obligation to engage in battles related to attacks on US 
property or territory. In addition, these exercises provide the United States the 
opportunity to train its forces in the Philippines for greater operability in similar terrain. 
Furthermore, the joint nature of these activities provides a confidence-building 
atmosphere and facilitates the flow of information. Lastly, these exercises sustain defense 
and security relations, both in the region and bilaterally.  
Circumstances in the late 1980s that led to the closure of US military bases 
affected Philippine-American security relations. The Philippine Senate's rejection of the 
proposed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security strained Philippine-American 
relations, but both countries decided to keep the 1951 MDT. In the aftermath of its forces, 
the US significantly downgraded its political and military relations with the Philippines 
by declaring that the US could no longer guarantee the external defense of the Philippines 
since American forces had lost a facility from which to operate.31 The Mischief Reef 
incident of 1995 challenged the 1951 MDT. The People’s Republic of China constructed 
                                                 
30 “Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
America”; Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, available from 
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/frame/frmmdt.htm, accessed on 27 September 2005. 
31 Renato C. De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-US Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold 
War or an Alliance for the 21st Century,” Asian Survey, November/December 2003, 976. 
22 
structures that featured guard posts, helipads, and satellite antennas at Mischief Reef, 
which part of the Spratly Islands located 50 miles west of Palawan, the Philippines' 
nearest land mass, and 620 miles southeast of China.32 According to Leszek Buszynski, 
the Philippines had sought an American commitment to their defense, but the US side 
pointed to Article 5 of the MDT, which states that “an armed attack on either of the 
parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the 
Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed 
forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”33 According to International Boundary 
Consultants, the term “Pacific Area” was left ambiguous in the defense treaty. 
Washington interpreted the treaty as applying to the territory of the Philippines at the 
time the treaty was signed, which would exclude all of the Spratly Islands.34  The 
Philippines first declared its claim to the Spratly Islands with a 1978 Presidential Decree.  
In response to the emerging threats of the rise in transnational terrorism, and 
particularly the activities of al Qaeda, the ASG, and the hostage-taking situations 
involving American citizens, the Philippines and the United States have renewed their 
security cooperation. The US government provided counterterrorism assistance to the 
Philippines in the form of reconditioned military equipment and increased frequency of 
military exercises.  In 2002, Balikatan 02-1 was conducted to assist the AFP in its 
operations against the Abu Sayyaf. However, this counterterrorism cooperation was 
challenged by Filipino nationalists on its constitutionality. In a privileged speech, 
Philippine Party-List Representative Satur Ocampo claimed that under the Arroyo 
administration, the Philippine government and US officials routinely invoke the MDT 
and the VFA to justify the series of Balikatan exercises.35 He maintained that the MDT 
and the VFA explicitly provide only for joint military actions and training exercises 
aimed at defending the Philippines from external aggression. Ocampo argues that the 
                                                 
32  Mischief Reef is also called Panganiban Reef by the Philippines. 
33 Leszek Buszynski,. “Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security,” Asian Survey, May/Jun 
2002, 496.  
34 “American Defense Commitments,” International Border Consultants, 15 August 1998, available 
from http://www.boundaries.com/US-Asia.htm, accessed on 2 October 2005. 
35 Satur Ocampo,. “On the Continued Presence of US Troops in the Philippines,” Privilege Speech at 
Philippine Congress, 05 August 2002, available from 
http://bayanmuna.net/legislation/priv_spch/12th_Cong/10-US_troops.htm, accessed on 7 October 2005. 
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ASG is clearly an internal security problem, not an external aggressor. On the other hand, 
former Ambassador to Washington Raul Rabe says that given the Abu Sayyaf links to the 
al Qaeda network, the aggression could be easily considered an “external armed 
attack.”36  
C. MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT 
Prior to the signing of the MDT in 1951, the first Philippine-US security 
arrangement were the Military Bases Agreement and the Military Assistance Agreement, 
both signed in 1947. The MBA gave the US access to Philippine bases for a lease period 
of 99 years. The US retained control of 23 military installations, including Clark Air Base 
and the extensive naval facilities at Subic Bay. One of the controversies surrounding the 
US bases revolved around issues of jurisdiction and base rights. The US, rather than 
Philippine authorities, retained full jurisdiction over the territories covered by the military 
installations, which including collecting taxes and trying offenders (including Filipinos) 
in cases involving US service personnel. This agreement was also linked to MAA, which 
provided for the transfer of US surplus equipment after World War II. In addition, the 
MAA established the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to advise 
and train the AFP. One of the most notable US supports to the Philippines was the 
military aid which was used to support and reorganize the Philippine Constabulary in the 
face of growing internal unrest during the Huk rebellion in late 1947.37  
The 1947 MBA was amended in 1979, updated in 1983, and terminated in 
September 1991. The US maintained that the military bases in the Philippines were vital 
for power projection in the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Middle Eastern theaters 
and wanted indefinite access to both facilities. The extension of US base rights became a 
pivotal issue in Philippine politics and the continuing US military presence in the 
Philippines after the Cold War faced stiff opposition from Filipino nationalists.  The 
nuclear issue also complicated matters.  Article 2 of the Philippine Constitution states that 
“the Philippines, consistent with national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom 
                                                 
36 Florentino Chay Hofileña, “Signed, sealed & delivered,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Newsbreak, 31 
January 2002, available from http://www.inq7.net/nwsbrk/2002/jan/31/nbk_3-2.htm, accessed on 7 October 
2005. 
37 The Huk Rebellion was a communist-led peasant uprising in central Luzon that came close to 
victory in 1950 but was subsequently defeated by a combination of advanced US weaponry supplied to the 
Philippine government and administrative reforms under the charismatic President Ramon Magsaysay. 
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from nuclear weapons in its territory.”38 Interpreted strictly, this article challenged the 
US policy of never confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons at any 
specific location. In November 24, 1991, the last US Navy ship sailed out of Subic Bay 
and the US flag was finally lowered and the Philippine flag hoisted as a symbol of the 
resumption of Philippine jurisdiction and sovereignty over the military bases. Even with 
the termination of the 1947 MBA, the two countries remain defense allies under the 1951 
MDT.  
D. VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT  
The US bases closure had a negative impact on RP-US relations. Joint exercises 
were suspended in 1996, when the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that a bilateral 
agreement ratified by the Philippine Senate was necessary before any joint exercises 
could take place. The two sides agreed to suspend large-scale military exercises until a 
formal agreement on the treatment of visiting US defense and military personnel was 
finalized. Before 1996, Balikatan exercises had been held almost every year since 1981. 
Despite these circumstances, the two nations have remained committed to the strategic 
objectives of the 1951 MDT. As this commitment would require regular military 
exercises between Philippine and US armed forces, both sides agreed to conclude an 
agreement to regulate the temporary visits of US defense and military personnel for 
military exercises. The VFA was negotiated for almost two years and eventually signed 
in 1998 and ratified by the Philippine Senate on May 27, 1999.  
The VFA is a mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under 
which US forces may visit the Philippines for bilateral military exercises. The VFA 
governs the entry and exit of US personnel and establishes the manner of disposing of 
criminal cases against any member who commits an offense in the Philippines.39 The 
VFA also establishes a procedure for resolving differences that may arise between the 
two sides with regard to the provisions of the agreement. Although the VFA permits only 
joint exercises, there is fear in the Philippines that the agreement may be a pretext for the 
return of American bases. The VFA was regarded by anti-US groups as heralding the re-
                                                 
38 “Philippine Constitution of 1987,” Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, available from 
http://www.chanrobles.com/philsupremelaw1.htm, accessed on 27 September 2005. 
39 “Primer on the VFA,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, available from 
http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/frame/frmpri.htm, accessed on 27 September 2005. 
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entrance of US troops into the Philippines a mere six years after their departure, but 
nevertheless passed the Senate with majority support.  
Despite of the ratification of the VFA, anti-VFA advocates argue that it suffers 
from many flaws. Dr. Francisco Nemenzo, a professor of political science at the 
University of the Philippines, maintains that it is an affront to the Philippine Constitution 
because it grants extraterritorial rights to Americans, and it can involve the Philippines in 
unnecessary international conflicts.40 Nemenzo cites Article II, Section 8 of the 
Philippine Constitution, which provides that “The Philippines, consistent with the 
national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its 
territory.” Nemenzo argues that the VFA does not contain any clause authorizing teams 
of Filipino scientists and military officers to board every nuclear-capable aircraft and 
naval vessel to ensure that they are not carrying nuclear weapons. He states that this is 
imperative because of the no-nuclear policy in the Constitution. Nemenzo’s second 
argument pertains to extraterritoriality. He argues that as a sovereign nation, the 
Philippine government must have full jurisdiction over any person, citizen or visiting 
foreigner, who commits a crime on its territory. The VFA, he claims, obliges the 
Philippines to abdicate this right with respect to US soldiers and civilians who come here 
in connection with some undefined military activities. Nemenzo’s third objection pertains 
to the ambiguity of the VFA's coverage. He states that the VFA talks of activities 
involving American and Filipino troops, but nowhere is the term “activities” defined. By 
leaving the term vague, he argues, the VFA allows the Americans to undertake any kind 
of military operations based in the Philippines, like launching missiles against 
neighboring countries or engaging in hot pursuit of suspected terrorists. Additionally, he 
asks that if military operations which constitute a blatant disregard of Philippine 
sovereignty are not what the agreement intended, why not insert a well defined statement 
of purpose? In support of Nemenzo’s arguments, BAYAN41, BAYAN MUNA42 and the 
                                                 
40 Francisco Nemenzo, “What’s Wrong with the Visiting Forces Agreement?” National Defense 
College of the Philippines, 1998, available from http://www.philsol.nl/A99a/VFA-Nemenzo-1.htm, 
accessed on 27 September 2005. 
41 BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) is an umbrella movement and broad alliance of church 
groups, peasant organizations, labor federations, youth and student movements, women’s groups, fisher 
folk, indigenous peoples, lawyers, health workers, and other professionals. 
42 BAYAN MUNA is a national political party under the Philippine party-list system. 
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Public Interest Law Center,43 filed a petition before the Philippine Supreme Court that 
there is absolutely no written agreement between the Philippines and the United States 
governing Balikatan 02-1. They argue that Balikatan 02-1 is not covered by the VFA 
contrary to the insistence of the Philippine government.44  On the other hand, pro-VFA 
supporters argue that VFA is important to the Philippines, especially when the country is 
faced with security threats and short of funds for military modernization.45 Since the US 
withdrawal in 1992, the Philippines has been engulfed by a sense of vulnerability which 
is heightened by China's encroachment into islets the Philippines holds in the Spratly 
islands in the South China Sea.  
E. MUTUAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
To sustain the revitalized Philippine-American security cooperation, the 
Philippines and the United States signed the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement 
(MLSA). The MLSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
(ACSA), which the US has with 76 other countries. ACSA provides the basic framework 
for cooperation in military logistic matters. This bilateral agreement provides for the 
exchange of logistic support, supplies and services on a reimbursable basis. The 
agreement does not in any way commit a country to any military action.46 An ACSA 
allows US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, 
transportation, ammunition, and equipment. According to Banlaoi, the Philippine defense 
establishment regards the MLSA as a defense-to-defense agreement designed to facilitate 
reciprocal transfer of logistics support between the Philippines and American forces. It is 
regarded as a serious implementation of the MDT and an effective reinforcement of the 
VFA. The Philippine defense department views the MLSA as a politically significant 
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agreement that will strengthen the bonds of strategic partnership of the Philippines and 
the US in the light of the Philippines’ support to the US-led antiterrorist campaign.47 
However, nationalist Filipino critics argue that the MLSA is an agreement that 
would allow the US to have a permanent military presence in the Philippines after the 
termination of the 1947 MBA. According to George Radics, since the MLSA allows the 
cross-servicing of US ships, planes, and troops in the Philippine soil, the US can enter 
any region of the country and receive the same type of services it would have on its own 
military bases, thereby effectively turning the Philippines into a huge military base.48 In 
contradiction to these fears of US re-entry to the Philippines, Admiral Dennis Blair, 
former Commander of the US Pacific Command, stresses that the US is not establishing 
permanent bases in the Philippines and emphasizes that there is no need, intention or 
desire to have permanent bases in the Philippines such as the US had in the past.49 To 
allay fears that the MLSA compromises the Philippines' security interest, Foreign Affairs 
Secretary Blas Ople points out that the MLSA does not commit the Philippines to 
participate in any conflict or war.  He states that any decision to involve the Philippines 
in a conflict or a war would have to be made under existing laws, and nothing in the 
MLSA compels the Philippines to join any conflict or war. Ople stresses that the decision  
to go to war is made only with the concurrence of Philippine Congress. Furthermore, the 
MLSA can come into play in conjunction with an approved activity under the MDT, the 
VFA or the MAA.50 
F. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Philippine-American security relationship was again revitalized 
with the signing of the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2002 Mutual Logistic 
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Support Agreement. The two agreements are important to the serious implementation of 
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, especially with the rise of transnational terrorism. The 
renewed Philippine-American security alliance was not achieved without difficulty. After 
the closure of the US military bases in the Philippines, Filipino nationalists, anti-US 
politicians, and leftist militants challenged the re-entry of US forces onto Philippine soil. 
Most of their arguments were based on Article 18 Section 25 of the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution, which provides that after the 1991 expiration of the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement, “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the 
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress 
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum 
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”51 
Accordingly, the VFA was signed by the two countries to allow continuation of the joint 
military exercises which are essential under the 1951 MDT. Additionally, the Mischief 
Reef incident played a major role in the Philippine Senate’s approval of the VFA. China's 
continuing aggression in its claim to the Spratly Islands and the Philippine military's 
weakness in defending its claimed territories led the Philippines to rely on the MDT for 
deterrence. However, VFA critics argue that the United States' only interest in the South 
China Sea is freedom of navigation. As long as China does not threaten that freedom, the 
US will continue to remain uninvolved on the issues concerning the Spratly Islands.  
Moreover, the US does not consider the Spratly Islands to be covered by the MDT and 
the ratification of the VFA will not change this situation. It is only logical that the US 
will not go to war for the Philippines simply because an armada of Chinese warships is 
present in the reef. 
The rise of terrorism incidents alarmed the international community, particularly 
the Abu Sayyaf’s kidnapping of European tourists in Sipadan Island in Malaysia, 
followed by the hostage-taking in Palawan Island that involved three American citizens. 
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US was already training with 
the AFP to combat terrorism. The 9/11 incident, however, emphasized the necessity of 
increasing US efforts to help the Philippine military enhance its capabilities.  
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After the resumption of Balikatan exercises, along with the signing of the MLSA, 
Filipino anti-US activists objected that the MLSA is a ploy by the US to re-establish a 
permanent presence in the Philippines. A close look at the provisions of the MLSA 
clearly shows, in Article 4, “that no US military base, facility, or permanent structure 
shall be constructed, established, or allowed under this agreement.”52 The MLSA will 
enable reciprocal logistic support between the Philippines and the United States for the 
duration of approved activity undertaken under the MDT and the VFA. The MLSA will 
be beneficial for the Philippines and will enhance the AFP’s capability to address 
potential security threats, particularly in regards to the transfer of US military supplies 
and equipment. 
In conclusion, Philippine-American security cooperation is again strong and 
improving. Dissenting opinions can be expected from Filipino nationalists, leftist 
politicians and anti-US militants who will voice their objections.  This is a part of the 
democratic process--the freedom of expression. However, those critics must acknowledge 
that to counter the emergence of transnational terrorism, a closer cooperation among 
states should be emphasized. Through bilateral and multilateral security agreements, a 
more robust effort can be achieved, not only to combat terrorism, but also to develop 
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III. RP-US BALIKATAN 02-1: BACKGROUND, OUTCOME, AND 
LESSONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2002, US military advisers arrived in Mindanao to train and assist the 
Philippine military in fighting the Abu Sayyaf Group in a non-combat capacity.   
Balikatan 02-1 was a joint military exercise with the purpose of improving Philippines 
and US combined planning, combat readiness and interoperability. The exercise was 
envisioned to enhance security relations and demonstrate US resolve to support the 
Philippines against external aggression and terrorism through training in joint combined 
operations and the conduct of other related activities consistent with the Mutual Defense 
Treaty.53  
Once the exercise was made known to the Philippine public, many Filipinos 
voiced their objections. Some alleged that the exercise was unconstitutional, while others 
feared that US involvement in Mindanao would aggravate the security condition in 
Mindanao similar to what had happened in Vietnam. The joint military exercise was also 
protested by many anti-US groups as a renewed phase of US military intervention in the 
Philippines.54 Questions were raised about the legality of the presence of US troops in 
war-torn Mindanao, which was viewed as contrary to the provisions of the Philippine 
Constitution banning the conduct of military operations by foreign troops on Philippine 
soil. Filipino critics, mostly belonging to leftist and anti-US organizations, argued that the 
Balikatan exercise series served as a perfect opportunity to evade the potential 
controversy that would have otherwise been associated with the US Global War on 
Terrorism by allowing the US to enter the Philippines militarily under the guise of an 
annual, legally-substantiated operation.55 Despite criticisms, there was also positive 
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support from the Philippine public. According to the Social Weather Survey, “most 
Filipinos are satisfied with the US help to the AFP in fighting the Abu Sayyaf; however, 
divided regarding the size of benefit to the Philippines from the Balikatan exercises; and 
one-half would like the US soldiers to go to other combat zones aside from the Abu 
Sayyaf zones.”56 Abinales also maintains that “popular approval for Balikatan 02-1 came 
not only from Christian Filipinos; over sixty percent of Mindanao Muslims also 
supported the exercise.”57  
This chapter provides a background on the conflict in Mindanao prior to the 
conduct of Balikatan 02-1; discusses what factors motivated the governments of the 
Philippines and the US to conduct the exercise in Mindanao; and examines the legal 
framework of Balikatan 02-1; the proceedings and outcomes of the joint military 
exercise. Furthermore, this chapter assesses the conduct of the RP-US Balikatan 02-1 and 
determines its successes and failures using five measures of effectiveness: (1) its 
contribution to the professionalization of the AFP, (2) the degree of transparency during 
the planning and execution of the exercise, (3) the inclusion of relevant stakeholders in 
Mindanao, (4) the effectiveness of the humanitarian and civic action projects, and (5) the 
support given by the Philippine civil society. This chapter also focuses on how future 
Balikatan exercises may be conducted to sustain security in Mindanao. The main 
argument is that Balikatan is a potential tool for building peace in Mindanao by creating a 
sense of security in that region. Capitalizing on the successes of Balikatan 02-1 and 
simultaneously addressing its failures can help it promote sustainable security in 
Mindanao. In this thesis, sustainable security can be understood as a process of 
addressing current traditional and non-traditional security threats, while developing and 
maintaining mechanisms and structures designed to meet future security challenges based 
on people-centered security, good governance, security sector reform, and a continuing 
dialogue. The standard by which one measures sustainable security is the existence of 
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four core institutions, namely: a competent domestic police force and corrections system, 
an efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy, an independent 
judicial system that works under the rule of law, and a professional and disciplined 
military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.58 
B. THE CONFLICT IN MINDANAO 
Mindanao is the second largest and southernmost island in the Philippines.59 It is 
considered the home of the country’s Muslim population and has a current population of 
about 18 million. In 1903, the Muslims in Mindanao make up 76 percent of the 
population; however, it had declined to only 19 percent by 1990.  At the village level, one 
will mostly find homogenous ethnic communities but at the regional, provincial and 
municipal levels, there is multi-ethnicity. Additionally, Muslim ethnic groups in 
Mindanao speak related languages, and practice many customs that are similar. Many 
Muslim ethnic communities live in close proximity to Christian and other non-Muslim 
Filipino indigenous groups called lumads. However, these Muslim ethnic groups remain 
separate from the majority in the Philippine nation-state not only by religion but also by 
the presence of political movements animated by the idea of belonging to a separate 
Moro nation called Bangsamoro.60 The island group of Mindanao encompasses six 
administrative regions which are further subdivided into 25 provinces, of which only four 
are not on Mindanao Island itself. The island group includes the Sulu Archipelago, 
Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi, plus outlying islands in other areas such as Camiguin, 
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1. The Conflict during Colonial Period 
The arrival of Islam in Mindanao predated the arrival of Spaniards in the 16th 
century when Muslim traders from today’s Indonesia and Malaysia came to the islands to 
barter their merchandise. The Muslim traders were responsible for the inhabitants' 
conversion to Islam, as well the formation of the Muslim Sultanates in the western part of 
Mindanao.61 In 1565, Spain colonized the northern and central archipelago.  Large areas 
of the Muslim south remained largely untouched by western rule until the arrival of the 
Americans in 1898, whereupon most of the islands were brought under central control, 
although hostility and conflict remained endemic.62 For the whole duration of Spanish 
rule, uncolonized indigenous populations of Mindanao fought to preserve their culture 
and traditions.  
After the Spanish-American War and under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Spanish 
authorities ceded the Philippines to the Americans for 20 million American dollars. After 
approval by the US Congress, the treaty formally converted the status of the Philippines 
from Spanish possession to American colony. In August 1899, the US sent Brigadier 
General John Bates to Sulu to negotiate a treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. An 
agreement was reached wherein sovereignty of the United States over the Sulu 
archipelago and its dependencies was acknowledged by the Sulu Sultan. On the other 
hand, the US pledged to respect the authority of the Sultan and also guaranteed complete 
protection for him and his clan leaders, agreeing as well not to interfere in the prevailing 
Muslim or Moro’s practice of their religion and their customs.63 
In the early part of twentieth century, substantial Christian settlement began to 
increase in Mindanao as corporate investments in agriculture, logging, mining and the 
production of export products gained headway within the second decade of American 
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rule.64 As a result, migration from Luzon and Visayas to Mindanao began to increase as 
more people arrived to work for American industries. Initially, the Muslims in Mindanao 
were comfortable with the arrangements, but when more American troops were deployed 
in Mindanao to occupy ports in the region, it aroused insecurities among the Moros, 
particularly in regard to their practice of religion and way of life. Soon their grievances 
exploded into violence when some Muslims attacked American soldiers after the 
Americans imposed customs regulations, collected taxes, surveyed lands, conducted 
census, and more importantly, forbade the Moro practice of slavery. The bloodiest 
encounter between the Americans and the Moros occurred on March 1906 during the 
battle of Bud Dajo in Sulu. After two days of fierce fighting about 1,000 Moros, 
including women and children were slaughtered. Only six survived, while the American 
forces suffered 21 killed and 73 wounded. Another major military encounter was the 
battle of Bud Bagsak, Sulu, on June 11 through 15, 1913 over the issue of the 
disarmament policy which the Moros vigorously resisted, saying they would never 
surrender their firearms. Brigadier General John Pershing led the American troops and 
after five days of combat action, 500 Moros were annihilated, with 14 Americans killed 
and 13 others wounded.65 Muslim hostility was interpreted as a challenge to American 
sovereignty and as a result, US governance in Mindanao shifted from non-interference to 
direct rule with the establishment of the Moro Province.66 
The Philippine Bill of 1902, which provided for eventual independence, prompted 
the Americans to abandon the policy of indirect rule. Also, the new policy for direct rule 
was envisioned as preparing for the integration of the Moros into a modern political 
body.67 When the US government promised to grant independence to the Filipino people, 
Muslim leaders in Mindanao filed their opposition to incorporation under the new 
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Philippine republic, while Christian Filipino leaders insisted that Mindanao was 
inseparable from the Philippines. In 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth was established 
as the last stage toward independence. In reaction, 90 Moro leaders gathered in Dansalan 
(now Marawi City) on March 18, 1935 and passed a strongly-worded manifesto pleading 
with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to exclude Mindanao and Sulu in the grant of 
independence to the Filipinos.68 However, the Americans did not give due consideration 
to the request and despite the various petitions and protests by Muslim leaders, Moro 
Province became part of the Philippine territory.  
2. The Conflict after Independence 
After Philippine independence in 1946, a deliberate policy of resettlement was 
implemented by the central government in Manila to populate empty areas in Mindanao, 
as well to serve as a deterrent to the spread of Islam.69 The resettlement of Christians 
from the islands of Luzon and Visayas eventually resulted in having a Christian majority 
in Mindanao overall, with Muslim-majority areas concentrated only in the central and 
southwestern regions. The political and economic integration of Mindanao in the long 
term resulted in Muslim marginalization. 
As internal migration from the north to the south increased, animosities among 
Christians and Muslims in Mindanao also deepened due to intrusions by Christian settlers 
into Muslim lands. Sporadic conflicts between Muslim and Christian arose over land 
which was apparently sold to Christians by the Muslims but later repossessed by the latter 
when the farms were seen productive. Resistance to settlers later led to armed conflicts.70 
In addition to the conflicts in Mindanao, insurgent activities of the communist-dominated 
Huks also erupted in Luzon. The Huks resorted to violence to achieve land reform and 
gain political power. With US military assistance, the Philippine government put an end 
to the insurgency. The Philippine government implemented a relocation program for 
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former members of the Huk movement, which included the awarding of government-
owned lands in Mindanao so that the former rebels could start a new life.71 The arrival of 
former Huks and ex-soldiers proceeded inexorably as public lands were made available. 
Many of the lands in Mindanao were considered public lands because Moros did not have 
formal titles to claim ownership. The massive influx of Christian settlers from the north 
further created bitter conflicts in land distribution and ownership among Christian 
Filipinos and Moros.  
By the end of the 1960s, Muslim grievances had grown into a full-fledged 
organized separatist movement. Among the immediate critical events that led to the 
formation of an organized front and war for secession was the Jabidah massacre of March 
18, 1968. The Jabidah Special Forces, composed of Moro recruits, were undergoing 
training in unconventional warfare on Corregidor Island with the alleged aim of seizing 
the disputed Malaysian state of Sabah under a plan code-named “Operation Merdeka.”72 
The Moro recruits were allegedly shot for refusing to obey orders and to keep them from 
revealing details of the operation.73 Two months after the alleged execution of the Moro 
recruits, Datu Udtog Matalam, the governor of Cotabato and one of the most prominent 
Moro Datu politicians, founded the Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence Movement 
(MIM) and called for the creation of an ideal Islamic state. At the height of the 
Philippine-Malaysian dispute on Sabah and the 1968 Jabidah incident, some members of 
the MIM underwent guerilla training in Sabah. These men reportedly formed the core of 
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the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). After the declaration of martial law in 
1972, the Muslim movement took an armed revolutionary approach to the struggle of 
establishing the Bangsamoro74 Islamic State. Among the young leaders of this movement 
was Nur Misuari, a professor at the University of the Philippines, who later emerged as 
the recognized leader of the Muslim struggle for independence.  
From 1972 to 1976, the Moros fought a war of attrition against the Philippine 
government resulting in thousands of deaths on both sides. The fighting that ensued was 
considered the most serious threat to the security of the state and the bloodiest fighting in 
the Philippines since World War II. It reached its peak and a stalemate in 1975. The 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) urged the Philippine government to pursuit a 
political and peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, and particularly 
the representatives of the MNLF.75 Peace negotiations were held from 1977 to 1979 in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Tripoli, Libya with the OIC as the mediating body. On 
December 23, 1976, the Tripoli Agreement was signed, highlighting the establishment of 
Muslim autonomy. However, the implementation of the agreement failed when President 
Marcos “unilaterally issued Proclamation No. 1628 (followed up in 1979 by Presidential 
Decree No. 1618) which resulted in the creation of two autonomous governments for 
Regions IX (Central Mindanao) and XII (Western Mindanao) which the MNLF 
rejected.”76 
By the end of the 1970s, MNLF strength declined, with its troops dispersed and in 
disarray. Many MNLF rebels surrendered after the Philippine government offered 
inducements and rewards. The MNLF also suffered from political and ideological 
problems that caused divisions along ethnic lines. The movement ultimately divided in 
1977 whereupon a more Islamic-oriented group – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
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(MILF) was formed.77  The MNLF weakened and its capacity to continue the struggle 
was significantly reduced, thus generating an incentive for them to seek an agreement 
with the Philippine government.78  
3. The Conflict after Democratization in 1986 
In 1985, President Marcos made a surprising announcement of a snap election in 
the following year and the growing opposition movement fielded Corazon Aquino as 
their presidential candidate. The elections were held on February 7, 1986 and were 
marred by widespread reports of violence and tampering of election results. The National 
Assembly declared the election in favor of Marcos; however, Cory Aquino refused to 
concede defeat and called on her followers to a protest rally the next day. Tensions grew 
with civil disobedience and general strikes held as a symbol of protest against Marcos’ 
continuing rule. The Philippine military under the leadership Lieutenant General Fidel 
Ramos and Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile called on Marcos to resign and by the 
morning of February 25, almost the entire armed forces had deserted Marcos in support 
of Cory Aquino. In the afternoon, angry crowds began to gather outside the Presidential 
Palace and at that evening, Marcos and his family fled the Philippines.79  
With the newly regained democracy, the MNLF entered into peace negotiations 
with the new government of President Corazon Aquino that eventually led to the creation 
of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the establishment of its 
first regional government in 1990.80 However, the security situation in Mindanao was 
further complicated when another group broke away from the MNLF and formed the Abu 
Sayyaf Group in the early 1990s. The Abu Sayyaf was led by Moros who fought in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet war and were students of radical Islamic teachings. The 
group’s first recorded operation was an attack on a military checkpoint in Basilan Island  
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in 1991, followed by a series of kidnappings and attacks between 1993 and 1995. In April 
1995, Abu Sayyaf conducted its first large scale operation when it raided and burned the 
town of Ipil in Mindanao.81  
In 1996, an internationally brokered peace agreement was signed by the 
Philippine government and the MNLF in Jakarta, Indonesia. The 1996 Jakarta Accord 
consisted of a “three-year extendible transitional Southern Philippines Council for Peace 
and Development (SPCPD), under the Office of the President, to give the MNLF the 
necessary exposure and chance to prove itself over a 14-province Special Zone of Peace 
and Development (SZOPAD), and thereby prepare the ground for a new autonomous 
region and government with presumably expanded powers and territory but subject to 
specified constitutional processes.”82 From 1996 to the present, the MNLF has been at 
the helm of the regional government of the ARMM and some MNLF leaders have also 
successfully run for local government positions.  
However, the 1996 final peace agreement did not end the war because two 
splinter groups, the MILF and the ASG, opposed the peace agreement and vowed to 
establish an Islamic state in Mindanao. The Philippine government, under the leadership 
of President Fidel Ramos, pursued negotiations with the MILF and exploratory talks were 
arranged in 1997. The MILF emphasized nine broad issues:  ancestral domain, displaced 
and landless Moros, destruction of properties and war victims, human rights issues, social 
and cultural discrimination, corruption of the mind and moral fiber, economic inequities 
and widespread poverty, exploitation of natural resources, and agrarian related issues.83 
Furthermore, the MILF clamored for government recognition of its camps, calling for the 
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Philippine military to withdraw from these areas.84  The Philippine government agreed to 
recognize some of the camps as “zones of peace and development.”85  
In the 1998 Philippine elections, Joseph Estrada, a movie actor, was elected as the 
new President. Estrada continued the peace program initiated by his predecessor; 
however, formal peace talks were only resumed in 1999.  Military operations against the 
Abu Sayyaf complicated peace negotiations with the MILF, as it became difficult for the 
AFP to separate the ASG and the MILF because they were situated in the same locations. 
The ASG easily seek refuge in MILF controlled areas. During this time, violent 
engagements between the Philippine military and the MILF began to develop again, 
eventually leading to the declaration by President Estrada of an “all-out war” against the 
MILF.86 
On July 2000, the AFP overran MILF camps, which was considered a significant 
setback to the rebel group. However, contrary to expectations, the MILF did not fight in 
positional warfare to defend the camps, but abandoned the area, disbanded into small 
groups of guerillas and dispersed to the countryside.87 The MILF organized and 
conducted a counterattack in several areas. Hashim Salamat, the chief of the MILF, took 
refuge in Malaysia and called on the Moro people to rise in a jihad.88 While the AFP was 
conducting military offensive against the MILF, the ASG took 58 hostages, including a 
priest, several teachers and students in Basilan, and demanded ransoms. A little more 
than a month later, the ASG faction in Jolo took 21 hostages89 from a Sipadan Diving 
Resort in Malaysia.90 The hostages were later released after the Libyan government paid 
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ransom in the amount of $20 million. The Libyan money attracted thousands of Abu 
Sayyaf recruits and supporters, and financed the purchase of new arms and equipment.91 
On May 27, 2001, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped another group of 20 hostages, consisting of 
17 Filipinos and three Americans, from the Dos Palmas resort on the Philippine island of 
Palawan and took them to their Basilan stronghold. One of the American hostages, 
Guillermo Sobero, was beheaded by the group and was later found in a shallow grave.92 
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency after Estrada 
was pressured to vacate the position, she sought the assistance of the Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir and Indonesian President Wahid to convince the MILF to resume the 
stalled negotiations. On March 24, 2001, the Philippine government and the MILF signed 
an agreement in Kuala Lumpur for the resumption of peace talks. Following the 
agreement forged in Kuala Lumpur, the MILF and the Philippine government declared a 
cessation of hostilities.  A new agreement known as the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 
2001 was signed in Tripoli, Libya.  It calls for discussion of three issues:  security aspects 
and ceasefire, rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas, and ancestral 
domain.93 
In that same year, 37 MNLF leaders signed a resolution declaring a loss of 
confidence and withdrawing support from Nur Misuari as chairman of the MNLF and 
governor of the ARMM. They accused Misuari’s leadership of being dictatorial, arrogant, 
divisive, and causing further disunity within the MNLF. During the Bangsamoro 
Congress in November 2001, Misuari became vocal, declaring that the 1996 Peace 
Agreement “is all but dead” and accusing the Philippine government of failing to give 
ARMM full autonomy and sufficient funding.94 On the morning of November 19, 2001, 
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200 members of Misuari’s renegade group attacked a police station in Maimbung, Sulu 
and held hostage 17 police personnel. Afterwards, the group harassed the 104th Infantry 
Brigade of the Philippine Army in Jolo, Sulu. While the attacks were being carried out in 
Sulu, forces loyal to Misuari were massing at the MNLF’s headquarters in Kabatangan 
Complex in Zamboanga City. In response, Philippine military forces bombed positions 
occupied by Misuari loyalists. As they tried to escape the bombardment, rebels snatched 
local residents from their homes and used them as shields. After the failure of the 
uprising, Misuari fled to Malaysia, where he was arrested by the Malaysian government 
and turned over to the Philippine government. 
4. Conclusion 
Although religious differences have partly shaped the conflict, its roots lie in the 
clash of interests over land and other natural resources, and the identity issues emerging 
from the second-class status of much of the Moro population during their integration into 
the Philippine republic. Furthermore, a combination of several variables also contributed 
to the worsening of the conflict in Mindanao; these include socioeconomic deprivation, 
political marginalization, government ineptitude, and corruption. Muslim grievances over 
land distribution and the lack of political representation resulting from colonial era 
policies have been the most fundamental concern of the Moros.   
The emergence of the Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist group and its alleged links with Al 
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah further complicated the peace process in Mindanao. The 
Philippine government seeks a peace agreement with the MILF while on the other hand, a 
“no negotiation” and “all-out-war” policy is being implemented against the Abu Sayyaf. 
In 2001, the United States offered assistance to the Philippine government in fighting 
Abu Sayyaf and by January 2002, US military advisers had arrived in Mindanao to train 
the Philippine military in a non-combat capacity under the aegis of the Balikatan exercise 
series.  
C. BALIKATAN 02-1: TERMS OF REFERENCE AND INVOLVED PARTIES 
In comparison with prior Balikatan exercises, begun in 1981, Balikatan 02-1 can 
be considered special in terms of its goals, objectives and activities. The goals, objectives 
and activities of previous Balikatan exercises focused on interoperability training against 
an external threat, while Balikatan 02-1, in addition to the interoperability training, also 
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involved the US in an advisory role in fighting the Abu Sayyaf Group. Past training 
exercises had been held in controlled environments on Luzon Island where insurgent 
threats are not imminent.95 Balikatan 02-1 was held at the island of Basilan, the 
Philippines’ hotbed of Islamic insurgency and extremism and the stronghold of the Abu 
Sayyaf Group. Furthermore, MILF forces are also situated in Basilan, and Philippine 
combat operations with US military assistance may have unexpectedly triggered 
hostilities with the MILF. Therefore, many Filipino critics feared the US military 
presence in Mindanao would derail the ongoing peace talks and force the MILF back to 
armed struggle for Muslim Mindanao independence.  
The special conduct of Balikatan 02-1 raised questions about its legality, 
particularly the issue of US military presence in Mindanao where a Muslim secessionist 
movement has been ongoing for three decades. An American couple, together with other 
Filipino hostages, was held captive by the Abu Sayyaf during that time. The Philippine-
American military cooperation in Mindanao was conducted under the veil of the existing 
bilateral military agreement. However, it was charged that the bilateral cooperation was 
contrary to the provision of the Philippine Constitution banning foreign troops from 
conducting military operations on Philippine soil. Filipino constitutionalists viewed the 
US military presence in Mindanao as a combat operation directed towards the ASG to 
rescue the American hostages, Martin and Gracia Burnham. Roland Simbulan, a 
professor at the University of the Philippines, argued that “all the existing security 
agreements of the Philippines and the United States (Mutual Defense Treaty, Military 
Assistance Agreement, Visiting Forces Agreement) do not have provisions for the 
deployment of foreign military forces, advisers, foreign military trainers or coordinators 
in actual combat operations.”96  
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Filipino critics, led by members of SANLAKAS97 and Partido ng Manggagawa,98 
filed a case with the Philippine Supreme Court challenging the legality of Balikatan 02-1. 
The two political parties stressed that the Philippine Constitution prohibits the presence 
of foreign military troops or facilities in the country, except under a treaty duly concurred 
in by the Senate and recognized by the other country. They emphasized that the 
Philippines and the United States signed the 1951 agreement to provide mutual military 
assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the 
case of an armed attacked by external aggressors. They argued that the ASG in Basilan 
does not constitute as an external armed force that has subjected the Philippines to an 
armed external attack warranting US military assistance under the 1951 MDT. They also 
contended that no treaties allow US troops to engage in combat, and that the VFA does 
not authorize US soldiers to engage in combat operations or even to fire back if fired 
upon.99  
1. Terms of Reference 
The governments of the Philippines and the United States assert that the bilateral 
military cooperation is a joint military training exercise sanctioned under the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. In order to clear doubts and suspicions, a Terms of Reference (TOR) was 
executed to provide a framework that governing the conduct of Balikatan 02-1.100 In this 
legal proceeding, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the legality of Balikatan 02-1 and 
determined that the Balikatan 02-1 TOR rightly fell within the context of the VFA.101 In 
support of the legal proceeding, the Philippine Supreme Court based its decision on the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing 
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interpretations of international agreements. In relation to the ambiguity surrounding the 
meaning of the word “activities” as stated in provision of the VFA, the Philippine 
Supreme Court viewed that it was deliberately constructed to give both parties leeway in 
negotiation.  In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for 
purposes other than military.  As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on 
new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea 
search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic 
action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, 
and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan 
exercises.  It is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 falls under the umbrella of 
sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.   
The Balikatan 02-1 TOR governing the US troops and Filipino soldiers was put in 
place to allay fears that the US military would engage in combat operations, considering 
that the exercise sites are near the combat zone areas in Basilan. This marked a departure 
from prior exercises in that lethal rules of engagement are involved. US forces could 
advise, assist and train Philippine units, but they would not engage in direct combat. US 
soldiers in the Philippines could engage in combat in acts of self-defense only if they 
came under attack.102  
The Balikatan TOR specified that it was an exercise to advise, assist, and train the 
Philippine military in its efforts against the Abu Sayyaf Group, to be conducted in 
Basilan and in Zamboanga. Related support activities were to be conducted in Cebu. It 
would be conducted and completed within a period of six months with the participation 
of 660 US personnel and 3,800 Philippine forces. Furthermore, only 160 US troops, 
organized in 12-man Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams, were to be deployed with 
the AFP field commanders. Most importantly, the US troops would not engage in combat 
operations, without prejudice to their rights to self-defense.103 
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2. Involved Parties 
The conduct of Balikatan 02-1 basically involved three major parties: the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the United States Government, and the 
adversaries consisting of major threat groups from the southern Philippines secessionist 
movements and the communist New People’s Army. The Philippine government policy 
since August 2000 has been constant military pressure on the ASG. In September 2000, 
the AFP committed over 1,500 troops into Jolo to conduct operations against ASG units 
that had kidnapped foreigners in Malaysia. Likewise, the AFP also sent troops to the 
island of Basilan after the hostage-taking in Palawan that included three Americans. The 
AFP operations were limited by several factors.  One is the difficult terrain of the two 
islands. A second factor is the civilian support given to the ASG on Jolo and Basilan, and 
a third was the limited AFP equipment. A fourth limitation is the unevenness in the 
quality of the AFP, because several of its units were doubted to have colluded with the 
ASG. The fifth limitation was the hostage situation itself, because European governments 
pressured the Philippine government to refrain from excessive military operations while 
ASG held the European hostages.  This constrained AFP from conducting air bombing, 
as well as from using artillery and mortars out of concern for the hostages' safety. 
Another limitation was the AFP’s deployment of troops.  Most of its forces in Mindanao 
are positioned in areas dominated by the MILF and MNLF. Only a small percentage of 
forces were committed against the ASG during that time. A final constraint was the 
danger of AFP operations producing large numbers of civilian casualties or displaced 
civilians. The Philippine government has opposed payment of ransom for hostages. 
However, the reality is that the government allowed the payment of ransom from 
hostages’ families and from European governments through Libya in 2000.104  
a. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
To combat terrorism in the Philippines, a national policy was formulated 
by the Arroyo administration that specifies the government’s adherence to international 
covenants on terrorism.  Also, as an active member of the United Nations, “the 
Philippines reaffirmed its commitment to prevent, suppress, counter all forms of terrorist 
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acts in accordance with the UN charter, resolutions and declarations, and other relevant 
international laws. It shall endeavor to work closely with the regional and international 
community, particularly with the ASEAN, the United States and other allies, in order to 
strengthen the global cooperation to combat international terrorism.”105  
The Philippine government national policy is articulated through the 
“Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action Against Terrorism,”106 namely:  
1. Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government 
against terrorism 
2. Intelligence coordination 
3. Internal focus against terrorism 
4. Accountability of public and private corporations and personalities 
5. Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook 
6. Legal measures 
7. Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity 
8. Vigilance against the movement of terrorists and their supporters, 
equipment, weapons and funds 
9. Contingency plans 
10. Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure 
11. Support of overseas Filipino workers 
12. Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine 
National Police 
13. Media support 
14. Political, social and economic measures 
The Philippine national policy on counterterrorism further specifies the 
government’s commitment to cooperate in the international struggle against terrorism by 
joining the international counter-terrorist coalition and work with the United Nations and 
the United States on intelligence and security matters concerning terrorism. The 14 
Pillars seek to strengthen internal efforts against terrorism through delineation of 
responsibilities, modernization of the AFP and the police force, anticipation and 
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preparation for future attacks, enlisting the cooperation of other sectors in the society 
such as the media, and addressing the varied underpinnings of terrorism. The Philippine 
government will also synchronize its internal efforts with the global war against 
terrorism.107 
b. The United States Government 
To help the Philippines in combating terrorism, the United States 
government sent groups of military observers to Mindanao in October 2001 to assess 
AFP operations against the ASG and examine AFP equipment needs. President Bush 
extended military aid to the Philippines when President Arroyo visited Washington in 
November 2001, and he offered a direct US military role in fighting the Abu Sayyaf. 
However, President Arroyo insisted that the US military role should be advisory and that 
the AFP would retain full operational responsibility.108 By late December 2001, AFP 
units on Mindanao began to receive US military equipment.  In January 2002, it was 
announced that the US would deploy 650 troops to the southern Philippines, specifically 
to Zamboanga and Basilan within the month for training and advisory functions; and that 
some of these troops would accompany AFP units on Basilan. In committing troops, the 
US government reportedly wanted to avoid military involvement with the MILF.  The 
Philippine government supported this position because it paralleled the government’s 
policy of maintaining a ceasefire that was negotiated in 2001 with the MILF.109 
However, the ceasefire became shaky in February and March 2001 when fighting broke 
out at an MILF stronghold on Mindanao and as a result, US considered placing the MILF 
on its list of foreign terrorist organizations.  However, the Philippine government 
convinced US officials not to take that action in the interest of preserving the ceasefire 
agreement.110 
The United States government considers the Philippines a major center of 
antiterrorism efforts because of its strategic importance, concentrated Muslim population, 
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and insurgency movements. Based on its GWOT goals and priorities, the US has created 
a comprehensive counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policy package towards the 
Philippines, one that includes political, military, and economic aid components. 
Additionally, the US government has frozen the assets and funding base of listed foreign 
terrorist organizations (FTO) active in the Philippines, including Al-Qaeda, JI, ASG, and 
the CPP/NPA.111  The US supports peace negotiations between the Philippine 
government and the MILF that are currently mediated by Malaysia, pledging more 
development aid when a peace agreement is established. The United States Institute of 
Peace (USIP), an independent federal organization, is facilitating the dialogue to help 
create a durable peace agreement, acknowledging that regional peace is key to countering 
terrorism in the Philippines.112  
According to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, one of the 
US approaches to defeating terrorism is through the 4D strategy (Defeat, Deny, Diminish, 
and Defend), which calls for defeating organizations of global reach through the direct or 
indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial 
intelligence, and other instruments of power.113 To accomplish this goal, United States 
seeks to identify, locate, and destroy these terrorist organizations. It is also the goal of the 
US to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by emphasizing the 
responsibilities of all states to combat terrorism both within their borders and 
internationally. America is willing to provide assistance to states willing to combat 
terrorism but without the means, but when states are reluctant or unwilling to deny 
support and sanctuary to terrorists, the US will “take appropriate steps to convince them 
to change their policies.”114  
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c. The Insurgency Factions 
The US designated four organizations in the Philippines as foreign 
terrorist organizations:  the New People’s Army, Abu Sayyaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, 
and Al Qaeda.115 The New People’s Army was responsible for attacks against US military 
personnel and interests in the Philippines and in 1989, achieved one of its greatest 
accomplishments in assassinating Colonel James Rowe, the Chief of the Joint United 
States Military Advisory Group for the Philippines.116 The Abu Sayyaf Group was 
designated as a terrorist organization in 1997 and was re-designated again in 2001. The 
Abu Sayyaf was responsible for kidnapping 20 westerners, including four Americans, of 
which one was beheaded and only two survived. There is also evidence that Al Qaeda 
and Jemaah Islamiyah have been operating in the Philippines and allegedly have links 
with the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. It was reported that 
the MILF provide training camps to Al Qaeda and JI members, but MILF consistently 
denies this link and even condemns the activities of these groups as un-Islamic.  
(1) The Communist New People’s Army (NPA). Aside from 
the threat posed by the Islamic secessionist movements, the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP), the political head of the NPA, also has called for attacks on American 
targets and claims responsibility for the murder of an American hiker and the firing on an 
American transport aircraft in January 2002 on the island of Luzon.117 The US 
government placed the CPP and the NPA on the official US list of terrorist organizations 
in August 2002. CPP/NPA aims to overthrow the government of the Philippines and 
opposes any US military presence in the country. Press reports in 1999 and in late 2001 
indicated that the group was targeting US troops participating in joint military exercises 
as well as US Embassy personnel. The group has claimed responsibility for 
assassinations and expressed its intent to target US personnel in its operating areas. The 
CPP/NPA contends that Balikatan 02-1 is a direct US intervention in Philippine internal 
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affairs. They maintain that it violates the sovereignty of the Philippines and claim that the 
US military presence in Mindanao on the pretext of solving the Abu Sayyaf problem is a 
“total surrender of the right of the Filipino nation to self-determination and its own 
resolution of internal matters.”118   
What are the implications of Balikatan 02-1 for the Philippine 
communist insurgency? The CPP/NPA view is that the US involvement in the fight 
against the ASG will have deep long-term implications on the revolutionary movement. 
They believe that US security assistance to the Philippine government is a big obstacle to 
the continuation of peace talks between the Philippine government and National 
Democratic Front (NDF), which have continually stalled since the middle of 2001.  
(2) The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Southern 
Philippine Secessionist Movement is composed of two main groups, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group.  The MILF is considered the vanguard of the 
Islamic movement in Mindanao and the neighboring islands. It was formed in 1977 when 
it separated from the Moro National Liberation Front, which was advocating a more 
moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. The MNLF signed an 
agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions and accepted the 
government's offer of autonomy. On the other hand, the MILF, then the second largest 
faction of the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movement, refused to accept the accord 
and initiated a brief offensive against the Philippine governments, later settling for a 
cessation of hostilities. In the 1990’s the MILF launched a wave of terrorist attacks in the 
southern Philippines, compelling former President Estrada to pursue an “all-out war” 
against the organization in 1998. President Arroyo has resumed peace talks with the 
MILF since assuming office, and several ceasefires have been agreed upon, only to be 
broken in subsequent weeks or months.  In May 2000, the GRP-MILF peace talks broke 
down, and the AFP launched a major assault on the MILF military headquarters at Camp 
Abubakar, capturing the camp. The offensive did not significantly harm the group’s 
military capabilities, as most of its senior leaders had been evacuated before the camp 
fell. In response to the military offensive, the MILF countered with a series of bombings 
in Manila. A splinter group also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack against the                                                  
118 “CPP Primers on Balikatan,” Philippine Revolution Web Central, available from 
http://www.philippinerevolution.org/pib/primers/primer.shtml, accessed on 28 September 2005. 
54 
Philippine ambassador to Indonesia and a series of bombs that exploded in the capital. 
Testimony of captured JI leaders and other evidence point to strong links between the 
MILF and JI, including the continued training of JI terrorists in MILF camps.119 
However, MILF leaders deny links with JI, although many reports link some local MILF 
commands with the terrorist organization.120 It is also alleged that the MILF has had ties 
with al Qaeda beginning in the late 1980s, when they dispatched troops to Afghanistan 
for training. Later, the MILF opened their camps to al Qaeda trainers and members of JI, 
providing them training and sanctuary. For the MILF, it is a show of Islamic solidarity, as 
well as a precautionary measure should the peace process fail. But the Abu Sayyaf Group 
has taken advantage of this, having moved into MILF-controlled regions.  In some 
instances, it was alleged that ASG members perpetrate terrorist activities with the help of 
MILF or JI members. The Philippine government downplays this triangular relationship 
for fear of upsetting the peace process with the MILF. During the conduct of Balikatan 
02-1, the MILF spokesman, Eid Kabalu, announced that it had no plans to disrupt the   
exercise provided that US and Philippine troops did not enter MILF areas.121 However, 
the MILF warned that the military’s sustained operations could lead to  clashes with the 
MILF rebels and stated that the MILF would avoid encounters with government troops, 
but if engaged, would fight back.122 
(3) The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The target of Filipino-
American military cooperation is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). It is a small, violent, 
faction-ridden Muslim group operating in the peripheries of Mindanao. It is considered 
the most radical of the Islamic separatist groups in the southern Philippines, with a record 
of killings and kidnappings and links with Al Qaeda. The origins of the ASG can be 
traced to Afghanistan when Moro fundamentalist numbering between 300 and 
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500volunteered arrived in Pakistan to serve as mujahidins.123 One of them was 
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani who later organized the ASG in the early 1990s as an 
underground group that aims to propagate Muslim fundamentalism. Janjalani was 
originally a member of the Dahwa Jama’t Tabligh, a fundamentalist group in Marawi 
City founded by Professor Amilhussein Jumaani and Abe Dologan of the Mindanao State 
University. Janjalani also studied Islamic Jurisprudence in Egypt, as well as Jihad and 
Islamic Revolution in Pakistan before volunteering to fight the Afghan War with the 
International Islamic Brigade in the 1980s. The ASG was originally known as the 
Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters and was first thought of as nothing more than 
a local (provincial) version of the MNLF and/or MILF, a breakaway faction of the former 
movement.124 Janjalani’s fundamentalist group was later renamed Al Harakut-ul Al 
Islamiyya (AHAI) meaning Islamic movement or the Abu Sayyaf Group in 1992.125 
Janjalani was given the alias “Abu Sayyaf’ meaning “Bearer of the Sword”, as leader and 
founder of AHAI. ASG’s main thrust was to establish an Islamic state in the southern 
Philippines following the end of MNLF secessionist movement.126  
In the pursuit establishing an independent Islamic theocratic state 
of Mindanao, ASG defined its ideological and operational agenda as intimately tied to an 
integrated effort aimed at asserting the global dominance of Islam through armed 
struggle.127 The ASG is the smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups in 
the southern Philippine and has raided resorts, taken tourists hostage, captured Christian 
villages, engages in bombings, assassinations, and extortion to promote an independent 
Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern 
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Philippines heavily populated by Muslims.128 However, the ASG operates more like 
criminals than terrorists and are usually satisfied by collecting ransom.129  
Although ASG espoused Islamic extremism and called for jihad, 
the ASG lost their religious foundation with the death of their founder in 1998 during a 
clash with Philippine military and police forces. After Janjalani’s death, the ASG instead 
turned more to criminal activities, such as kidnapping for ransom.  Reportedly, his 
younger brother, Khadafi Janjalani, became the nominal leader of the group, which 
includes several factions. However, analysts maintain that ASG is returning to their 
religion basis with the help and influence of JI and the MILF.130 The ASG kidnapped 
three American citizens in May 2001, and one was beheaded in June. In the spring of 
2004, new evidence surfaced that Abu Sayyaf is active in Manila, as well. In April 2004, 
police officials reportedly determined that the February 2004 ferry bombing, in which 
over 100 people died, was the work of the ASG and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement, a 
group of idealistic Filipino Muslim converts from the Manila area.131 Douglas Lovelace, 
Director of the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, maintains that “though 
the ASG is usually preceded with the words the 'al Qaeda-linked,' there was little tangible 
evidence of such a link from the mid-1990s to 2002. From its founding in 1991 through 
Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka Plot in 1995, the links were clear and convincing.”132  
There are two major groups within the ASG that operates in Sulu 
and Basilan.133 The Sulu based ASG is composed of several armed groups that has no 
formal organization and considered drastically beyond the fundamentalist attitude of the 
ASG. The Basilan based ASG, unlike their counterpart in Sulu, is organized into one 
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main group led by Janjalani and Abu Sabaya.134.The ASG is organized into three basic 
groups within the whole organization. This grouping is utilized and during movement, 
combat, and occupation of temporary or permanent bases. These groupings are; Forward 
Security Element (FS), the Main Body (MB), and the Rear Security Element (RS). Figure 
2 is an illustration of ASG combat elements. 
 
Figure 2.   ASG Combat Elements135 
The ASG has transformed and ceased to further the ideological 
bases of their armed struggle. The consequence of this transformation will prove to be 
threatening in the current dimension of security concerns in southern Philippines. The 
ASG is an example of the transformation of local separatist movements in the southern 
Philippines where ideologues transformed in “commercial insurgents” because of the 
misunderstanding of ideology in behalf of pure profit and banditry. The Abu Sayyaf is 
changing its tactics and renewing its links with other extremists group, as Al Qaeda has 
increasingly sought to expand its key basing and staging region at Southeast Asia. Al 
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Qaeda’s complicated linkages with groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front, and the region-wide Jemaah Islamiyah has emerged as a challenge to Philippine-
American cooperation on the war on terror. 
D. GOALS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The goal of the Balikatan exercise series is to improve Philippine and US 
interoperability against external aggression. However, the end of the Cold War and the 
new emerging threat of transnational terrorism call for revitalized security cooperation 
between the two countries. In this respect, Balikatan 02-1 was somewhat different from 
previous military training exercises. In the past, military exercises were geared towards 
improving the tactics, coordination and maneuvers against a hypothetical threat from a 
common external enemy. Balikatan 02-1 is aimed at a threat within the country, a small 
bandit group in Basilan, which is a target of the US war on terrorism. During Balikatan 
02-1, participants were brought into the midst of an actual battlefield; the exercise lasted 
for about six months instead of the usual four week duration of previous exercises. 
Balikatan 02-1 had four specific objectives:136 
1) To improve the interoperability of Philippine and US forces against 
terrorism 
2) To enhance the combat capability of the AFP Southern Command (AFP 
SOUTHCOM) and the infantry battalions based in Mindanao 
3) To ensure quality in intelligence processing  
4) To upgrade Philippine–US capability to wage effective civil, military, and 
psychological operations. 
The United States and the Philippines agreed on a framework that US military 
forces would have no combat role, with their role is limited to the conduct of training and 
support operations to Philippine forces. Balikatan 02-1 represented a special 
counterterrorism-focused exercise on Basilan that involved 1,000 US forces in Mindanao. 
Training was also carried out in Luzon for two light infantry reaction companies, four 
light infantry battalions and helicopters for night operations. Current programs further 
enhance Philippine military counterterrorist capabilities through a five year program that 
started in 2002 that includes the terrorist interdiction program, a security assistance 
program and the transfer of excess military equipment and supplies under the Mutual 
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Logistics and Supplies Agreement (MLSA).137 Balikatan 02-1 was conceptualized when 
President Arroyo met US President George W. Bush at a summit meeting in Washington 
D.C in November 2001. President Bush expressed his appreciation for the Philippines’ 
support on the war against terrorism and offered direct US military assistance for the 
rebel-suppression campaign.138  President Arroyo declined the offer of troops and instead 
requested new equipment and training for the AFP to enhance its capability in 
neutralizing the ASG.139 The two state leaders approved an integrated plan providing for 
a robust training package for the AFP, delivery of equipment needed to increase the 
Philippine military’s mobility, and creation of a new bilateral defense consultative 
mechanism.140  On January 16, 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
announced the deployment of approximately 600 US troops to the southern Philippines to 
act as military advisers to the AFP SOUTHCOM and provide training to improve 
intelligence capabilities, operations in urban environments, medical training, casualty 
evacuation, and other related activities. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that US 
personnel would not engage in combat but retained the right of self defense.141  
The US military contingent deployed in Mindanao was designated as Joint Task 
Force 510 (JTF 510), headed by General Donald Wurster USAF, Commander of the US 
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC). JTF 510 used a counterinsurgency 
model designed to sever the people’s support to terrorists, strengthen appropriate 
government and military response to terrorism, and enhance the legitimacy of the 
government in relation to the people. JTF 510 applied a program of “building legitimacy” 
which included activities such as provision of potable water, medical care and facilities, 
confidence-in-government measures, all-weather roads, and maritime port and re-supply 
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areas.142 Additionally, it performed a number of tasks designed to enhance AFP response 
capabilities such as operations-intelligence fusion, task group training, unit training, 
professionalization of the non-commissioned officers, air mobility, maritime exclusion, 
staff integration, consistent rules of engagement (ROE) interpretations, and mission-
focused psychological (PSYOP) and civil-military operations (CMO).143 
Balikatan 02-1 was conducted in three phases. Phase 1 was the preparation phase.  
A series of planning conferences and exploratory talks was held to determine priority 
areas of concern to the two forces.  Phase 2 was the training and field exercise phase 
covering about a 4-month period. Phase 3 is the redeployment phase wherein 
participating US and Philippine personnel were returned to their respective units. During 
the six months of this operation, JTF 510 encountered a number of challenges and gained 
valuable benefits from lessons learned. The JTF had to scramble to get on top of public 
affairs issues and operations, and to deal usefully with the Philippine media. 
Humanitarian assistance required new and innovative approaches. Also, JTF 510 had to 
accustom itself to working together with non-government organizations.144  
For the whole duration of the exercise, the number of US military personnel 
deployed between January 2002 and July 31, 2002 was nearly 1,200, including 150 
Special Operations Forces. The exercise also included the deployment of over 300 troops 
(primarily Navy engineers) to carry out civic action projects such as road-building on 
Basilan. The Balikatan exercise reportedly resulted in a significant diminishing of Abu 
Sayyaf strength on Basilan. Abu Sayyaf had a peak strength of 1,270 active members in 
year 2000 and by the end of Balikatan 02-1 in 2002, they were reduced to 460 active 
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members.145 AFP operations improved as a result of US assistance in intelligence 
gathering, the provision of modern equipment, and aid in operations planning.146  
During the exercise, US troops performed limited roles such as providing 
intelligence support to the AFP SOUTHCOM and conducting special patrol and night 
operation training with AFP units. In effect, the US performed a purely supporting role, 
while the AFP retained the primary role of combating the ASG. US SOF personnel were 
also assigned to accompany AFP units in Basilan and although they were armed, they 
were bound by the ROE specifying that they fire their weapons only in self-defense. The 
objective of this arrangement was to allow US military advisers to observe and assess the 
performance of their Filipino counterparts.  
E. THE OUTCOME 
Militarily, Balikatan 02-1 was a mixed success. It was marked by an unsuccessful 
rescue effort that resulted in the deaths of the two hostages and the wounding of another. 
American missionary Martin Burnham was killed and his wife Gracia hospitalized after 
the rescue attempt by the Philippine military. Philippine nurse Ediborah Yap died during 
the rescue effort.147 The exercise also failed to eliminate the ASG. 
Nevertheless, the exercise was successful in capturing and killing of some of its 
key leaders. The most notable was the killing of Abu Sabaya in June 2002 by elements of 
the Naval Special Warfare Group of the Philippine Navy at the coast of Sibuco Town in 
Zamboanga Del Norte.148 Abu Sabaya, whose real name is Aldam Tilao, was a 
prominent spokesman for the ASG. He was well known to Philippine radio stations, 
which he would call with threats of terror attacks. He first burst into international 
headlines with the kidnapping of 21 foreigners on Sipadan Island, Malaysia. The hostages 
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were released after an enormous ransom, believed to have totaled $20 million, was paid 
by Libyan leader Muamar Qaddafi. The ransom was later used by the ASG to recruit 
followers from among the impoverished Muslim communities in the southern Philippines 
and to buy arms and equipment to continue their terrorist activities.149 
Despite the failure to eliminate the ASG as a threat group, the joint military 
exercise had considerable success in upgrading the AFP tactical maneuver force’s combat 
capability and AFP SOUTHCOM’s Integrated Territorial Defense System.150 This was 
evident when SOUTHCOM neutralized the ASG’s freedom of movement and minimized 
the group’s capability to conduct terrorist activities in Basilan. However, the ASG 
responded to the military’s tactical advantage by transferring its operations to other parts 
of Mindanao.  
The biggest gain of Balikatan 02-1 can be viewed more as political rather than 
military. Balikatan strengthened domestic political support for the Philippine-American 
alliance as complemented the Philippine government’s program of social reform and 
poverty alleviation to the poorest part of Mindanao.151 The local populace appreciated the 
economic and humanitarian assistance the accompanied the joint military exercise. The 
exercise also boosted the local economy through American employment of local 
companies for services like laundry and food catering.152 From the US perspective, the 
war on terrorism was extended in the Philippines without involving US troops in actual 
combat, as their participation was limited to advisory and humanitarian missions. On the 
other hand, the Philippines benefited from the US economic and military assistance. 
Balikatan 02-1 can be considered an example of a successful counterterrorist training and 
assistance mission accomplished on a small scale that combined various instruments 
(political, informational, civil affairs, economic, medical, etc.) with the military 
instrument of power to carry out a counterterrorist campaign. 
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Balikatan 02-1 officially ended in July 2002 and attempts were made to negotiate 
a second phase of US training support for the AFP. The negotiations have experienced 
difficulties in determining the rules of engagement.153 The basic issue has been whether 
any aspects of the US role could be considered a combat role. The two sides initially 
announced that US training of AFP light reaction companies would take place in northern 
Luzon and again on Mindanao. The objective was to train 16 light infantry companies by 
the end of 2003 for use against both Muslim insurgents and the NPA.154 In July 2002, the 
two governments decided that, except for aerial surveillance, US military personnel 
would not be involved in the stepped-up Philippine military campaign against the ASG 
on Jolo Island, south of Basilan, where ASG has concentrated strength. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Balikatan 02-1 has contributed to the professionalization of the AFP in a variety 
of ways. The enormous amount of security and military assistance the AFP received from 
the US enabled the Philippine military to upgrade a significant portion of its obsolete 
equipment. The AFP also received valuable training from Balikatan 02-1 that otherwise 
would not have been available, especially for AFP Southern Command. AFP Southern 
Command contains more than half of the 117,000-strong AFP and compared to other 
unified commands, AFP Southern Command is responsible for combating elements of the 
communist NPA, the MILF, and the ASG in many areas of the Mindanao region. It is 
only but proper that focus be given to AFP Southern Command for military training and 
assistance because of its significant responsibilities. Furthermore, Balikatan 02-1 
enhanced the AFP’s capability to conduct civic action and humanitarian projects that also 
enhanced civil-military relations in many impoverished areas. Collectively these benefits 
offer an enormous boost to the effectiveness of the Philippine military, along with the 
heightened public image of the AFP. Balikatan 02-1 also ensured quality intelligence 
processing that supported  AFP’s combat operations, the electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
provided by US unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellite imageries, and confirmed 
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by the AFP’s human intelligence (HUMINT), provided for more efficient and successful 
conduct of military operations, reducing possible collateral damages, including the life 
and property of non-combatants. 
Examining the degree of transparency during the planning and execution of 
Balikatan 02-1, it can be concluded that it was surrounded by “secrecy and lack of 
transparency” that triggered the activist and the politicians in condemning the joint 
military training activities. According to Concepcion Asis, “it was only late January 
[2002] when the Department of National Defense released what was to be known as the 
Terms of Reference (TOR) covering the joint exercises.” It was only when the Balikatan 
02-1 Terms of Reference was released did the public get to know what Balikatan was all 
about.155 
One reason why there were doubts, apprehensions, and fear on the conduct of 
Balikatan 02-1 in Mindanao was due to the lack of involvement of various non-military 
stakeholders in the planning stage. Planning of Balikatan 02-1 was mostly confined to 
military planners from both sides, except for some time when the Visiting Forces 
Agreement Commission were invited to attend. During the six months of Balikatan 02-1, 
US and Philippine military forces encountered a number of challenges, particularly in 
dealing with the Philippine media, and had to scramble to get on top of public affairs 
issues. Likewise, humanitarian assistance and civic action projects required new and 
innovative approaches, as well as accustom its forces in working together with NGOs and 
other sectors of the civil society.156 Managing development in areas of armed conflict 
demands innovative and altruistic solutions from the various stakeholders in Mindanao. A 
comprehensive planning and coordination of all who need to be involved (military, 
police, local government units, volunteer groups, private businesses, other national 
government agencies and civilian institutions) are required in order to have an effective 
response in providing solution to the roots and causes of the armed violence in Mindanao. 
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In view of the effectiveness of the humanitarian and civic action projects, the 
people of Basilan benefited in many ways from the projects conducted jointly by 
Philippine and US troops. One objective of the exercise is to reduce poverty in Basilan, 
which is considered a spawning ground for terrorist recruitment. Basilan has the lowest 
per capita income, the highest incidence of poverty, the lowest literacy rate, and the 
highest mortality rate. The combined efforts in Basilan during Balikatan 02-1 resulted in 
the construction of four wells that provide clean water, and the rehabilitation of an 
airfield that can now accommodate small commercial airline and will definitely open the 
province to opportunities for commerce and business. Likewise, the repair of roads and 
wharfs will reduce the cost of doing business in Basilan, facilitating the movement of 
goods and services, providing greater access within the province and to the other parts of 
the region and more importantly, enticing the entrepreneurs who fled from the violence to 
return and help rebuild Basilan. By increasing access to markets, the new infrastructure also 
allows for the easier movement of products from the countryside to the cities.  
The positive impact of these projects are undeniable, as even the harshest critics admitted 
that such infrastructure projects helped improve the livelihood of the people.157 The 
infrastructure projects helped restore a “new sense of peace and security.” Since the exercise, 
many residents of remote barangays in Basilan feel safe and secure and have now started 
to rebuild their homes, churches, mosques, and schools. People in Basilan now go out of 
their homes after dark, which is a sign that they no longer fear being caught in the middle 
of a firefight between government troops and insurgents.158  
Examining the support given by the Philippine civil society, a national survey 
showed that the Filipino public was highly supportive of the US military presence 
wherein 90% of Filipinos who are aware of the joint military exercises in Mindanao, 73% 
are in favor of continuing the exercises, and 65% of Filipinos support the extension of 
Balikatan.159 At the conclusion of Balikatan 02-1, there were clamors for the extension of 
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the joint military exercise. According to Pulse Asia Survey, “among geographical areas, 
support for Balikatan is highest in Mindanao, where the military exercise was held and 
where American dollars boosted the local economy. 81% of the people of Mindanao who 
are aware of Balikatan are in favor of its continuation. Respondents from urban 
Mindanao, in particular, give resounding support for Balikatan, 87% of them favor its 
continuation, while 9% are against it and 4% are undecided.160  
In general, Balikatan 02-1 can be considered a partial success. In spite of 
successes of Balikatan 02-1, it also failed to completely eliminate the ASG threat. 
Although the joint military exercise denied the ASG freedom of movement, the ASG was 
able to transfer its base of operations to other parts of the Mindanao region. Balikatan 02-
1 created a sense of security in Basilan, but this success may be temporary if no 
cooperative follow-up is forthcoming from the Philippine government. The joint military 
effort of “clearing” Basilan from threats posed by ASG should be taken advantage of in 
order to accomplish the Philippine campaign of “clear,” “hold,” “consolidate,” and 
“develop.”  If this campaign is not pursued, a possible resurgence of violence, not only 
from the ASG but also from other threat groups, may emerge again on the island of 
Basilan. 
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IV. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 
AND THE FUTURE BALIKATAN EXERCISES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Secessionist movements and the communist insurgency in the southern 
Philippines have put the Philippine government in a dilemma for more than three decades 
and have had a serious impact on the viability of the Philippines as a nation. Allowing 
secession is not an option for the Philippine government.  Its ultimate goal is to keep the 
national territory intact.  To accomplish this, the government must defeat the armed 
challenge posed by the southern Philippines secessionist movements and the NPA. In 
addition to fighting insurgents on the battlefield, the Philippine government also involved 
itself in peace negotiations with the insurgent movements. In 1996, the Philippine 
government and the Moro National Liberation Front reached a final peace agreement. 
The peace agreement addressed some of the MNLF grievances and has reduced recurring 
threats to the Moro way of life.161  
However, three major threat groups still exist, and additional groups are 
emerging.162 Peace talks between the Philippine government and the National 
Democratic Front, the political front of the Communist Party of the Philippines, stalled in 
2004, when the NDF unilaterally postponed the talks.163 On the one hand, peace 
negotiation with the MILF continues, with Malaysia acting as a third party facilitator. 
The US Institute of Peace also provides facilitation assistance to the peace process. On 
the other hand, Abu Sayyaf Group still engages in violent terrorist activities and develops 
ties with other terrorist organizations. According to Abuza, one of the major concerns for 
the Philippine government is “the degree to which the ASG members have recruited from 
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Balik-Islam Organizations.” These groups, composed of Christian converts to Islam, have 
given the ASG a reach into regions beyond the Muslim dominated areas of Mindanao.164  
Since the beginning of the Muslim and communist armed insurgencies in the 
1970s, the Philippine government has employed various approaches to end the armed 
conflicts in the country.  The most recent is the “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” 
strategy. The military and the police focus on the “clear” and “hold” stages, while other 
government line agencies support them during these initial stages and then take the lead 
role in the “consolidate” and “develop” stages.165 However, the campaign plan against 
the insurgency has not succeeded because the civilian agencies tasked to support the AFP 
in the last two stages (consolidation and development) have not been effective. Likewise, 
in many far-flung areas in the Philippines, local government officials and other civilian 
agencies are not always available, leaving it to the Philippine military to consolidate and 
develop these areas of conflict. From the AFP point of view, this is not a proper task for 
the military, and it is a task for which they are not trained.166   
This chapter introduces the concepts of stabilization and reconstruction operations 
that might be adopted by the Philippine government to build sustainable peace in the 
southern Philippines. As discussed in Chapter 3, Balikatan 02-1 illustrates how 
Philippine-American security cooperation can help promote sustainable peace in 
Mindanao. Incorporating the concepts of stabilization and reconstruction operations in 
future Balikatan exercises could enhance AFP’s capability. Likewise, stabilization and 
reconstruction operations can supplement the Philippines’ National Internal Security Plan 
in winning the war (and therefore winning the peace) in Mindanao.  
B. “CLEAR, HOLD, CONSOLIDATE, AND DEVELOP” STRATEGY 
The Philippine government utilizes the “strategy of holistic approach” with 
security, political, and socio-cultural-economic components to address the various armed 
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conflicts or insurgencies.167 The security component, consisting of the AFP and the 
Philippine National Police (PNP), deters or directly addresses violent conflicts, while the 
political component seeks the full cooperation of local government units and civil society 
in promoting good governance and local peace initiatives to create an environment and 
culture of peace in the community. The socio-cultural-economic component focuses on 
the ways and means to alleviate poverty and uplift the conditions of rural communities 
through the delivery of basic and social services.  
There are four phases of the campaign.  These are the clearing, holding, 
consolidating, and developing phases. The clearing phase involves the elimination of the 
enemy political infrastructure in the affected barangays and the destruction of the main 
enemy forces. This is the primary responsibility of Philippine security forces, 
spearheaded by the AFP. The holding phase consists of the reestablishment of 
government control and authority in the recovered areas. This is primarily the 
responsibility of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), supported by 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the AFP.  The consolidation phase overlaps with the 
holding phase. During this period, government control and authority is strengthened. 
Counter-organizations are further expanded in this phase, such as the people’s 
organizations or cooperatives for various community-based components. The final phase 
is the developmental phase, when the people’s organizations and cooperatives act as 
conduits for the government’s antipoverty program by serving as nuclei for rural 
economic development. The entry of involved agencies requires coordination to achieve 
cooperative action. The overlap provides the opportunity to develop social capital and 
interoperability among the various agencies of both government and nongovernmental 
organizations.168  
Following is an illustration defining the roles and synchronizing the efforts in 
each of the stages: 
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Figure 3.   Defining Roles and Synchronizing Efforts of Line Agencies169 
 
C. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 
Securing the peace in the aftermath of a conflict is one of the major goals of 
military operations. The military’s role in warfighting is unquestioned; however, its 
responsibilities in post-conflict environments are poorly understood. Similar to the 
Philippines’ experience in fighting insurgencies, the US military was employed to 
support rapid social change during the occupation of Germany and Japan after World 
War II, and to preserve the status quo during the Cold War.170 Traditional military 
operations have been characterized by planning for combat and a long buildup of forces, 
only after which would an offensive operation be launched. Armed conflicts typically last 
for long periods and end with negotiations for surrender or an armistice. When conflicts 
have relatively long durations, there is time to plan for stabilization and reconstruction 
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operations as the conflict winds down.171 Figure 4 illustrates the historical pattern of 
combat and stabilization and reconstruction missions. 
 
Figure 4.   Historical Pattern of Combat and Nation-Building Missions172 
 
Adopting the above model in the context of the Philippine campaign against 
insurgency and separatism, the time spent planning the operations and deploying forces 
was compressed.  With no plans for post-conflict operations, and without adequate 
capabilities to perform reconstruction promptly, there was a gap in addressing the roots 
and causes of the conflicts. Furthermore, planning and execution of AFP operations 
seldom involves other government agencies and civilian organizations. Figure 5 
illustrates the gap in the aftermath of Philippine counterinsurgency campaigns that can be 
supplemented by stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
                                                 




Figure 5.   Developing AFP’s S&R Capability: Bridge to Nation-Building173 
 
Stabilization and reconstruction missions (Phase 4) will address the gap between 
the end of major combat operations and the beginning of the nation-building. Planning 
for S&R missions should be concurrent with the planning for major combat operations 
and begins after the defeat of the enemy’s military. When stability is established and 
reconstruction underway, the process of nation-building can proceed with the national 
and local government agencies taking the lead and supported by the military, NGOs and 
other private volunteer organizations.174 Nation-building is a long-term process of 
promoting institutions which will provide for economic well-being and social equity of 
the people within the nation. Nation-building is often used simultaneously with 
democratization, political development, post-conflict reconstruction, and peace-building; 
however, each concept is different but all are intertwined. In general, nation-building can 
be described as the greater integration of state and society where the democratic 
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participation of the people is emphasized, together with the building of the society, 
economy, and polity that will meet the basic needs of the people.175    
The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the 
United States Army jointly formulated a “four-pillared” approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction. These are meant to stabilize a state through the improvement of four vital 
areas: security, social and economic well-being, governance and participation, and justice 
and reconciliation.176 Below is a description of the post-conflict reconstruction pillars as 
described by Robert Orr.177  
1. The security pillar addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the 
establishment of a safe and secure environment, as well as the 
development of legitimate and stable security institutions. 
2. The social and economic well-being pillar addresses the fundamental 
social and economic needs of the population, particularly the provision of 
emergency relief, restoration of basic services, laying the foundation for a 
viable economy, and initiation of a sustainable development program. 
3. The governance and participation pillar addresses the need for legitimate, 
effective political and administrative institutions and participatory 
processes. Governance involves the setting of rules and procedures for 
political decision-making and administration to deliver public services in 
an efficient and transparent manner. Participation encompasses the process 
of ensuring active participation of the local populace in the formulation of 
government policies through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the 
media to help ensure the generation and exchange of ideas. 
4. The justice and reconciliation pillar addresses the need for an impartial 
and accountable legal system and for ways to deal with past abuses, 
particularly the creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial 
system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and mechanisms for 
resolving grievances arising from the conflict. 
The four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction are inextricably linked and a 
positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across 
them. However, among the four pillars, security is considered the precondition for 
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fulfilling the other three pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.178 A secure environment 
must be created after the cessation of hostilities in order to facilitate the operations of 
other assisting organizations from various international and domestic organizations.179
 
The adequate establishment of security also fosters an environment where the local 
populace can conduct their daily business free from violence. However, this can be quite 
difficult in post-conflict environments where armed groups have disintegrated and 
diffused back into society without the skills to earn a living as civilians.180 Thus, the 
effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed factions back into 
society’s mainstream is important.  
After achieving a secure environment, the improvement of social and economic 
well-being is also essential to post-conflict operations.
 
In the aftermath of violent 
conflicts, often only “a small window of opportunity exists to restore economic hope and 
social well-being.”181 Improvement of socioeconomic conditions, coupled with an 
improved security situation, reverses the myopic tendencies induced by the conflict; this 
further reduces the number of individuals likely to seek employment from insurgent 
groups.182  The focus in the short term must be on restoring basic human services, and 
then shift to long-term socioeconomic development. Likewise, improved education 
opportunities must be made available to the affected populace to help reduce the risk of 
conflict and to provide long-term social, political, and religious tolerance. As Johanna 
Mendelson Forman maintains, “Restoring education immediately after the conflict sends 
a signal of hope to families whose lives have been turned upside down by the 
conflict.”183 Returning children to school also has an important deterrent power, and 
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removing young men from the streets limits opportunities for recruitment into insurgent 
and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the immediate reopening of the schools provides 
employment for many individuals in a community.  
According to Robert Orr, “good government requires an interactive two-way 
process between the government and the governed” and an essential component of good 
government is the ability to enable citizens to make their views heard and to act on those 
views.184 In post-conflict situations, building the capacity for governance and 
participation involves a broad range of tasks such as dialogues that “can help forge 
agreement on how the political system should be structured, or who should have a say in 
helping to design it.”185 Likewise, strengthening institutions that deliver goods and 
services to the population is another governance task and ensuring transparency in the 
accomplishment of this task is a major challenge, as “corruption can severely undermine 
all other efforts.”186 Transparency in governmental processes, such as budget 
development, fiscal flows, and delivery of goods and services, is vital for reducing 
corruption and its harmful effects.  By insuring the free flow of quality information, 
government accountability can be promoted.187  
Another crucial factor in rebuilding war-torn societies is upholding the rule of 
law. The establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict communities addresses past 
grievances, crimes, and atrocities and is vital for moving societies away from the clutches 
of the “conflict trap.”188 As described by Paul Collier, the conflict trap is the increased 
likelihood of reverting to a state of war if the previous conflict was more recently ended. 
Collier argues that “a country that has survived for a decade or more after independence 
before it first falls into the trap has a risk of new war ten times higher just after that war is 
ended than before the war started. If the country succeeds in maintaining post-conflict 
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peace for ten years or so, the risk is considerably reduced, but remains at a higher level 
than before the conflict.”189 In order to prevent or reduce this possibility, emergency 
justice measures should be established in order to deal with the most urgent law and order 
issues. These emergency measures may involve the deployment of international police 
forces, international monitoring teams, or multinational peacekeeping forces to monitor 
and mentor indigenous police forces. Additionally, activities promoting a culture of 
justice and reconciliation should be transparent and accessible to the broad population in 
order to support public security.190 According to Flournoy and Pan, reconciliation is a 
long-term process and a “failure to address justice and reconciliation needs on a priority 
basis is a recipe for failure in reconstruction operations.”191 
In applying the four pillars of stabilization and reconstruction, the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army jointly 
developed a task framework for post-conflict reconstruction. Recognizing that 
reconstruction occurs at various times during and after conflicts, the task framework 
encompasses vital activities between the cessation of hostilities and the return to 
normalization. Similar to the Philippines’ “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” strategy, 
the post-conflict reconstruction framework is structured in conceptual phases. The 
framework includes three phases:  initial response, transformation, and fostering 
sustainability. Initial response is often described as the military intervention for basic 
security, stability, and emergency services, while transformation focuses on developing 
legitimate and sustainable local capacity. The transformation phase often focuses on 
restarting the economy, establishing mechanisms for governance and participation, and 
securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. Fostering sustainability, the final 
phase, consolidates long-term recovery efforts to prevent conflict and the reemergence of 
violence.192 
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The National Internal Security Plan of the Philippine government articulates a 
sound strategy in countering insurgencies but it lacks a comprehensive plan that will 
integrate all efforts and resources of the national and local government agencies and non-
governmental organization in promoting peace and development in Mindanao and other 
conflict-stricken areas in the country. The post-conflict reconstruction task framework 
and its four pillars of security, governance and participation, social and economic well-
being, and justice and reconciliation, can enhance Philippines’ counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism strategies by providing a range of tasks often encountered when 
rebuilding communities in the aftermath of violent conflicts. The task framework will 
assist various Philippine government and non-government agencies in planning and 
coordinating their peace-building efforts, as well as help them conceptualize, organize, 
and prioritize responses by laying out the options that will help identify shortfalls and 
gaps in reconstruction process and capabilities.193 By adopting a similar post-conflict 
task framework, a comprehensive strategic and operational plan can be established that 
will lay out priorities and an appropriate division of labor among the many national and local 
actors involved in the peace efforts.  
D. FUTURE BALIKATAN EXERCISES 
Stabilization and reconstruction operation are a new concept for the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines.  The best way to learn this concept is by incorporating it into 
future Balikatan exercises. Stabilization and reconstruction operations can supplement the 
“clear, hold, consolidate and develop” strategy employed by the AFP in 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns.  Balikatan 02-1 provided a good 
example of how the “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” strategy can be effective in 
combating terrorism and insurgencies while at the same time transforming war-torn 
societies into viable communities. Balikatan 02-1 seriously degraded Abu Sayyaf group’s 
capabilities.  From a peak of 1,000 fighters in the mid-1990s, it has dwindled to a few 
hundred members.194 Likewise, the humanitarian and civic action programs of 
“Operation Gentle Wind,” with the help and support of international organizations, 
NGOs, and private volunteer organizations, provided medical treatment, supplies and 
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materials to the populace of Basilan and Zamboanga. Civil engineering projects, like the 
construction of water wells, farm-to-market roads, bridges, airfield, and a wharf were also 
completed.  These projects definitely opened the war-torn province of Basilan to new 
opportunities for commerce and business, as these projects facilitate the movement of 
goods and services and in the long run reduce the cost of doing business in Basilan. More 
importantly, the improved business climate will entice entrepreneurs who fled from the 
violence to return and help in reconstructing the province. According to Angel Rabasa, 
after achieving a secure environment in Basilan “there is now greater confidence in the 
government’s ability to protect the population.”195 
The successes of Balikatan 02-1 can be adopted in future RP-US joint military 
exercises.  In order to achieve more sustainable security in Mindanao, the involvement of 
key stakeholders during planning and execution of future exercises must be emphasized. 
The involvement of other organizations, like the local NGOs and private organizations,  
can increase the legitimacy as well as the transparency of planned activities. A higher 
level of transparency can reduce doubts and uncertainties of the real intent behind the 
activities, thus eliciting more support from the Philippine public. In the beginning, the 
Philippine public was apprehensive about supporting Balikatan 02-1, because the 
exercise was mostly conceptualized and controlled from a higher echelon.  With 
minimum participation from concerned organizations and private citizens of Mindanao, 
an impression of secrecy about the real intention of the exercise was created. Wider 
participation by other government agencies, NGOs, and private organizations in future 
Balikatan exercises provides a good opportunity to build social capital that will improve 
relationships among parties working for peace and development in Mindanao. Social 
capital builds trust and norms that “can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action.”196   
In future Balikatan exercises, military action is vital and necessary but it is clearly 
not sufficient to deter and resolve insurgency or terrorism. Insurgency and terrorism are 
multifaceted problems that must be solved by a package of policies and programs to 
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effectively and simultaneously address the economic, social, political, and military 
aspects of the situation. The participation of other key stakeholders is as important as the 
role of the military, and the involvement of these other stakeholders can open new doors 
in achieving peace in Mindanao.  
The Philippine National Internal Security Plan stipulates the creation of an Area 
Coordination Center (ACC) at the provincial level.  The standard system of integration 
includes the interface of local government units, national government agencies, police 
and military, NGOs, people’s organizations, and other stakeholders. The ACC is 
envisioned as an entity to coordinate and integrate the efforts of various stakeholders, 
taking into consideration their respective statutory mandates. The ACC is linked through 
various communication means to the members and participating stakeholders. Likewise, 
it is linked to the Operation Center (OPCEN) of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on 
Internal Security (COC-IS), which reports to the President through COC-IS.197 Figure 5 
illustrates the ACC at the provincial level.  
 
Figure 6.   Area Coordination Center at the Provincial Level 
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The first ACC was established in Zamboanga City in Mindanao.  It was used 
mostly to coordinate the police, military, and local government's anti-kidnapping efforts. 
The ACC was welcomed by the military.  But the ACC acknowledges that its success 
depends on how it is run by local officials. Many are apprehensive that the ACC may 
duplicate the work of the peace and order councils led by local officials.198 Reports 
indicate that some mayors and governors do not convene the peace and order councils, 
while others consider them to be “debating clubs.”199 By involving the relevant 
stakeholders in joint planning and training, relevant stakeholders in Mindanao can 
effectively synchronize their efforts to achieve peace and development for the southern 
Philippines. 
In previous Balikatan exercises, the focus was mainly on developing warfighting 
skills and capability.  Training for post-conflict operations was limited to civil-military 
operations like humanitarian assistance and civic action projects. The majority of 
Balikatan exercises included three major events: Command Post Exercise/Staff Exercise 
(CPPX/STAFFEX), Individual and Unit Level Training (ULTEX), and Field Training 
Exercise (FTX). CPX/STAFFEX is the most common exercise used for training the 
battalion staff, subordinate, and supporting leaders to successfully plan, coordinate, 
synchronize, and exercise command and control (C2) over operations during mission 
execution. Balikatan CPX/STAFFEX included scenarios for the four phases of combat 
operations. Phase I covers preparation for combat, followed by initial operations in Phase 
II. Phase III is combat, and Phase IV is called post-combat operations. Phase IV is often 
described as post-conflict operations and usually begins soon after the advent of combat 
during Phase III, so the two overlap. Phase IV can also be described as “transition 
operations” because military forces try to transition the area of conflict back to peace and 
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civilian government control.200 However, Balikatan training activities have been more 
focused on Phase I to Phase III operations, too often ignoring Phase IV operations. As 
Conrad Crane argues, “military leaders and planners focused on winning wars, not on the 
peacekeeping or nation-building that came afterward.”201 The military would usually 
rather not deal with nation-building, and prefer to quickly turn over this task to civilian 
government agencies and non-governmental organizations which are within their rightful 
sphere of responsibility and capabilities.  
Examining the Philippines’ experience in fighting insurgencies shows that 
planning for post-conflict operations is often neglected and deemphasized. The AFP was 
effective in planning and conducting combat operations, but mostly failed in 
consolidating cleared territories because they generally lack plans and resources to 
consolidate these areas. During an interview with Satur Ocampo, a Philippine party list 
representative, said that in 1994, the AFP declared strategic victory over the insurgents 
but by 1998, a study came out evaluating the military counterinsurgency plan and it said 
that from 1994 to 1997 the insurgency was able to recover. The analysis was that while 
the military components of the counterinsurgency plan were implemented, the socio-
economic components were not carried out wherein the people in the areas that were 
cleared did not gain anything. Thus, when the insurgents came back they were readily 
accepted. Ocampo further commented that the military component of the “clear, hold, 
consolidate, and develop” strategy was effective but the “develop” component was the 
part that did not happen.202 While there may have been plans at the national level, and 
even within various agencies on Mindanao, none of these plans were transferred to the 
tactical level. As a result of inadequate planning for post-conflict environments, the AFP 
encountered much difficulty maintaining peace and security, thus allowing for the 
possible resurgence of violence.  
 
                                                 
200 Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won,” Military Review, May-
June 2005, available from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_85/ai_n14695885, 
accessed on 8 November 2005. 
201 Ibid.  
202 The Armed Struggle and Agrarian Reform,” an exclusive interview with Satur Ocampo, available 
from http://www.inq7.net/exclusive/2001/sep/10/satur_10-4-1.htm, accessed on 24 November 2005. 
82 
E. CONCLUSION 
In principle, the “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” strategy of the Philippines 
is on the right track to solve the root causes of armed conflicts in Mindanao. It outlines a 
plan for how the national government agencies can work together in the different regions 
of the country. However, in reality, lots of coordination and cooperation must be 
developed among these agencies in order to synchronize their efforts to provide solutions 
to the problems in conflict areas, especially in Mindanao.  
The concept of stabilization and reconstruction operations can supplement 
Philippines’ National Internal Security Plan in operationalizing the “clear, hold, 
consolidate and develop” strategy. The post-conflict task framework is a good tool to 
help national government agencies work together toward a sustainable peace in 
Mindanao.  It involves clearly identifying the different tasks that should be performed to 
foster a sustainable peace process. Likewise, involvement of Area Coordination Centers 
(ACC) in planning and executing future Balikatan exercises in Mindanao can develop 
social capital among the various stakeholders in Mindanao, which will facilitate peace 
and development projects that in turn can prevent and deter Mindanaons from joining 
terrorist and insurgent groups. 
In conducting military training and exercises, it would be beneficial for the AFP 
to give due attention in the conduct of Phase IV operations. The Philippine military has 
been fighting insurgencies for the past three decades and has extensive experience in 
winning and losing wars, but has never developed its capabilities to win the peace in the 
aftermath of conflict. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For five centuries, the conflicts in Mindanao have persisted.  The rise of 
transnational terrorism, combined with the continuing socio-economic and political 
deprivation of the Moros, may mean that the violence will continue unless the Philippine 
government undertakes a concerted effort to address the root causes of the insurgencies.  
Throughout the Philippine campaign against insurgencies and terrorism, the government 
approach relied predominantly on a military solution. The counterinsurgency approach in 
the “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” operational strategy specified by the National 
Internal Security Plan (NISP) outlines a coordinated and integrated effort to address the 
root cause of the insurgencies by the entire government machinery, with the support and 
participation of civil society.  However, the lack of cohesion among the different 
Philippine government agencies and civil society in implementing the NISP impeded 
progress toward sustainable peace and development in the southern Philippines. Armed 
insurgent groups were defeated and the insurgents’ politico-military infrastructures were 
neutralized by the Philippine military, as lead government agency during the “clearing” 
phase.  These accomplishments were mostly not preserved by civilian government 
agencies, which failed to reestablish government control and authority in cleared areas. 
Failures in “holding, consolidating, and developing” cleared territories may allow re-
entry of or incursions by armed insurgent or terrorist groups, leading again to resurgence 
of armed violence. One major cause of this failure is the absence of a comprehensive 
operational plan that incorporates post-conflict operations (Phase IV) involving the 
Philippine military, other government agencies, civil society and other relevant 
stakeholders in Mindanao. 
During the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks in the 1950s, 
the Magsaysay government adopted a two-pronged military approach. The right-hand 
approach represented the armed response, while the left-hand represented socio-economic 
development, which was also the responsibility of soldiers. The left-hand approach 
included civic action projects that provided agricultural, medical, dental, and legal 
assistance to local communities where the insurgents operated. Roads, bridges, irrigation 
dams, schoolhouses and other physical infrastructure were also constructed. Part of the 
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left-hand approach was the awarding of lands in various parts of the country, particularly 
in Mindanao, to Huk insurgents who laid down their arms.203 The government strategy 
worked well in ending the Huk insurgency; however, land grants to former Huk 
insurgents in Mindanao heightened the Moros’ grievances over land distribution. Land 
issues have been the most fundamental Moro concern and are considered an important 
factor fueling conflicts between Christian and Muslim settlers in Mindanao. Private 
property, as understood by Filipino Christians, did not exist in the minds of the Moros at 
that time. The Moros think of land primarily as belonging to a clan, while for the 
Christians, it was a matter of individual ownership.204 The Moro grievances became a 
“war of independence” during the 1970s, and the two-pronged counterinsurgency 
approach of armed response and socio-economic development became a pure “war of 
attrition.” International intervention led to peace negotiations in 1976 that bore fruit when 
the Moro National Liberation Front signed a final peace agreement with the Philippine 
government in 1996. However, peace in Mindanao was temporary.  Violence broke out 
again with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front continuing their struggle for independence. 
The Abu Sayyaf Group compounded the insurgency problem with its wanton use of 
violence and their reported involvement with Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Since the 
mid-1990s, Philippine intelligence organizations have been aware of possible 
international terrorist involvement, but the Philippine government saw the presence of 
Arab-looking foreigners as primarily related to the hostilities between government troops 
and Moro guerrillas in Mindanao.205 The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States changed this perspective, bringing the international terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah into focus.  
In support of the war on terrorism, the Philippines and the US governments 
decided to conduct Balikatan 02-1 in Mindanao. The US military provided military 
assistance, training and support operations to the AFP in combating terrorism, 
particularly against the Abu Sayyaf Group. However, the conduct of Balikatan 02-1 in 
                                                 
203 Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines,” 1. 
204 Chester L. Hunt, “Moslem and Christian in the Philippines,” Pacific Affairs, Volume 28, Issue, 
December 1955, 331-349, available from JSTOR Database, accessed on 12 November 2005. 
205 William Wolters, “Muslim Rebel Movements in the Philippines: Recruitment for Al Qaeda 
terrorists?” Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology No. 40 (2002), 149.  
85 
Mindanao was challenged by Filipino nationalists, leftist militants and anti-US politicians 
as a violation of the Philippine constitution's prohibition of foreign military troops in 
combat operations on Philippine soil. The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Balikatan 02-1 and specified that the Balikatan 02-1 Terms of 
Reference rightly fell within the context of the Visiting Forces Agreement.  
Balikatan 02-1 successfully forced the ASG out of Basilan and this 
accomplishment facilitated humanitarian assistance and civic action projects proved 
beneficial to the people of Basilan. One objective of the exercise was to stop Basilan 
from becoming a spawning ground for terrorist recruitment by improving the socio-
economic condition of the province. The construction and repair of farm-to-market roads 
and the rehabilitation of airfield and seaports provided greater access inside the province 
and facilitated the movement of goods and services, resulting in reduced costs of doing 
business in Basilan. Likewise, the infrastructure projects of Balikatan 02-1 helped restore 
a “new sense of peace and security” in the province so the populace felt secure enough to 
rebuild their lives under a rule of law. Balikatan 02-1 also contributed to the 
professionalization of the AFP. The US security and military assistance enhanced the 
warfighting as well as the civil-military operations capability of the AFP. The quality 
intelligence processing and improved operation-intelligence fusion achieved during the 
joint military exercise provided for more efficient conduct of military operations. 
However, in spite of these gains, Balikatan 02-1 failed to completely eliminate the ASG 
threat.  
In view of the outcome of Balikatan 02-1, it is evident that military action is vital 
and necessary for combating insurgency and terrorism, but it is also apparent that military 
action is not sufficient to deter and resolve the root causes of insurgencies and terrorism. 
The participation of other government agencies, civil society, and other key stakeholders 
is as important as the military, and their involvement can open new doors to peace in 
Mindanao. National and local government agencies, NGOs and private volunteer 
organizations possess the knowledge and skill sets, if not the resources, to augment 
military capabilities in situations where AFP resources are already engaged. These 
situations include humanitarian and refugee assistance, establishment of political  
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institutions, and introduction of economic recovery initiatives like rebuilding basic 
services, including health and sanitation, transportation, and other human security 
infrastructures.   
To coordinate government efforts to address the Philippines’ perpetual 
insurgencies, the Philippine National Internal Security Plan mandated the creation of the 
Area Coordination Center at the sub-national and local government level. The ACC 
serves as an interface of national and local government agencies, the military and the 
police, NGOs and other stakeholders. Involvement of ACC members in planning, 
training, and execution of an overall counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operational 
plan can strengthen inter-agency coordination and cooperation in addressing the roots and 
causes of the insurgencies. The key to success in post-conflict settings is understanding 
that no military solution is possible without a political and economic solution, and that 
persistent conditions of insecurity prevent the accomplishment of an enduring positive, 
political and economic development.206  
Like the US concept of stabilization and reconstruction operations, the Philippine 
strategy of “clear, hold, consolidate and develop” tasked the military to secure the peace 
in the aftermath of conflict. A secure environment must be created to facilitate the 
operations of other organizations in restoring basic human services and then long-term 
socio-economic development. However, Philippine counterinsurgency experience 
demonstrates that plans may seem simple on paper but turn out to be difficult to 
implement. One way to improve the capability to execute plans is through training. The 
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the US military have been conducting joint military 
training and exercises since Philippine independence in 1946.  The Balikatan exercise 
series has been the largest military exercise since that time. This thesis argues that the 
Balikatan exercise series is an excellent platform to develop the AFP's stabilization and 
reconstruction operations capability with US military training assistance. Furthermore, 
the conduct of future Balikatan exercises in Mindanao would significantly benefit the 
AFP Southern Command, the people of Mindanao and the ongoing peace process. 
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In addition to the involvement of non-military organizations during planning, 
training, conduct and assessment of the government’s counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism campaign, developing stabilization and reconstruction operations 
capability within the AFP can enhance the Philippine military’s capacity to win the war 
and peace in Mindanao. As B.H. Liddell Hart suggests, “the object in war is to attain a 
better peace . . . If you concentrate exclusively in victory, with no thought of the after-
effect . . . it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of 
another war.”207 
In conclusion, this study has shown that the Balikatan exercise series, in addition 
to its objective of improving combat readiness and interoperability between the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines and the US military, can also be a significant peace-building 
tool for Mindanao. Since 1981, the exercise has focused on warfighting, failing to include 
plans and training for post-conflict operations in its exercise goals and objectives. Based 
on Philippine and US experience in conducting military operations, post-conflict 
operations are the most difficult to plan and execute, even under the best of 
circumstances. Military organizations concentrate on warfighting, and pay no attention to 
the challenges of dealing with the battlefield after the battle is over.208 Post-conflict 
operations should be an integral part of military planning. Key to immediate and long-
term success during post-conflict operations is a sound initial plan with a clear vision of 
the end-state objectives, informed by situational understanding, and with provisions or 
adapting the plan to accommodate changing environmental conditions. The Armed 
Forces of the Philippines must learn the S&R operational concepts and practices relevant 
to post-conflict missions in order to meet challenges in post-conflict environments. AFP 
unit commanders, staff officers, and individual soldiers must learn how to plan, 
coordinate, and conduct S&R operations with their non-military counterparts.  A unified 
effort between the military and non-military actors is essential to address the root causes 
of the Philippine insurgencies.  
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The Balikatan joint military exercise is a good platform to learn stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. At the same time, conducting future Balikatan exercises with 
training activities focused on S&R operations in Mindanao will be beneficial not only to 
the AFP but also to the people of Mindanao. Like Balikatan 02-1 in Basilan, future 
Balikatan exercises can promote peace and development in other places in Mindanao. 
The humanitarian assistance and civic action projects associated with the exercise can 
provide numerous opportunities that will improve human security conditions in the 
region. Furthermore, Balikatan exercises can help build local capacity among the non-
military actors in Mindanao. Non-military actors possess the knowledge and skill sets, if 
not resources, necessary to augment military capabilities in situations where AFP 
resources are not sufficient or already engaged in other security related concerns of a 
higher priority. These situations include humanitarian and refugee assistance, 
establishment of institutions, and the introduction of economic recovery initiatives that 
are important in rebuilding war-torn communities.   
 In order for future Balikatan exercises to successfully contribute in building 
sustainable peace in Mindanao, Area Coordination Centers at the provincial level must be 
involved during the planning and the conduct of future training exercises since they are 
usually knowledgeable about an area and its inhabitants. The ACC can help refine 
approaches that require military attention. Involvement of the ACC and other non-
military organizations can help AFP commanders to think through the consequences of 
their actions and assist them to recognize minimal requirements to plan their rules of 
engagement during and after the conflict. One of the most difficult tasks during 
counterinsurgency campaigns is integrating the diverse military and civilian agencies 
operating in the post-conflict environment and without a shared strategic vision, various 
actors will adamantly adhere to their own views and orientations, unwilling to integrate 
their efforts with the efforts of others. Building the capacity of the Area Coordination 
Centers at the local government level can help improve interagency coordination that will 
facilitate the integration and synchronization of efforts among the stakeholders. A unity 
of effort is essential to the establishment of an integrated, interagency response in support 
of a coherent strategy for stabilization and reconstruction operations.   
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